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The impact of QE: theory and evidence
The way QE has been interpreted and applied in the UK has benefitted some parts 
of the economy at the expense of others. While it has assisted some borrowers 
(including the Government) who have enjoyed lower medium and long-term interest 
rates, it is bank credit for productive GDP transactions, not interest rates, that is the 
primary driver of nominal GDP. In other words, success in lowering interest rates 
does not necessarily translate into success in stimulating the real economy.
In theory, QE should induce investors to move money away from holding 
government debt and into the corporate sector, boosting investment,  
production and employment. But it is highly uncertain that this mechanism of 
‘portfolio rebalancing’ works in reality. Instead – as evidenced by current volatility  
in stock, bond and currency markets – investors reacting to QE are likely to  
channel their money mainly into financial assets. This inflates the price of such 
assets, and enriches the assets’ owners, with minimal positive impact on the  
real economy. 
If it is broke, don’t use it: FLS and the problem with trying to get banks to lend 
Funding for Lending has stimulated bank credit for the real economy more directly 
than QE. But in practice this credit has mainly been in the form of mortgage debt 
rather than corporate lending, and has been severely constrained by the continued 
weaknesses of bank balance sheets. 
Even if bank lending does increase, we cannot be sure that it will lead to output, 
investment and employment rather than a new house price, commodities or stock 
market boom. Chronic structural weaknesses and perverse regulatory incentives 
mean that, without further policies, reliance on the UK banking system is not an 
effective channel for stimulating or rebalancing the economy.
Strategic QE: public money for public benefit
It is time to seriously consider more strategic use of the Bank of England’s powers 
as a bank.
An estimated £550bn of investment in new low-carbon infrastructure is required 
over the next 10 years in the UK,2 and housing construction remains at its lowest 
level in the post-war period. We therefore propose that the Asset Purchase Facility 
buys bonds issued by agencies with a specific remit for productive investment 
within the UK, such as in housing-building and retrofit, infrastructure and small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs). 
Executive summary
The Bank of England’s programmes of Quantitative Easing (QE) 
and Funding for Lending (FLS) are failing to stimulate GDP and 
rebalance the economy.1 Both policies falsely assume that the 
UK’s risk-averse capital markets, corporate sector and constrained 
banking system can be nudged into supporting the productive 
economy. We propose a new approach: one that channels 
investment directly into new housing, infrastructure and SME 
lending, boosting productivity and exports. QE must become less 
scattergun and more strategic, with reformed governance structures 
to match.
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Both government and opposition parties now support the economic case for a 
national development bank. However – as is the case with our Green Investment 
Bank – lack of a banking license and the Government’s reluctance to commit 
taxpayer funds will severely limit the British Business Bank’s scale and impact. 
Total capital for both these institutions of less than £4 billion compares with 
balance sheets of over £200bn for the Brazilian development bank and £400bn 
for Germany’s KfW. 
Central bank support for national infrastructure investment has worked before. 
The Industrial Development Bank of Canada, which supported Canadian SMEs 
from 1946-1972, was capitalised entirely by the Central Bank with not a single 
penny of taxpayers’ money required. In New Zealand in 1936, the central bank 
extended credit for the building of new homes, helping the country out of 
the Great Depression. Moreover, the majority of the UK’s major international 
competitors, including emerging market economies, have public investment 
banks or equivalent funds supporting infrastructure or SME financing.
We also examine the case for the APF purchasing a wider range of assets from 
banks in order to free up their capital for more productive lending. This has been 
successful in the USA and might improve the impact of QE here, but overall we 
recommend strategic QE as the best approach to rebalancing the UK economy.
Getting the governance right: the fiscal/monetary policy mix
Would strategic QE blur the line between monetary and fiscal policy? In 
reality the distinction has always been blurred. We should now be asking 
what governance systems could allow us to carry out hybrid monetary/fiscal 
measures, and then selecting the most effective tools to deploy. 
We suggest the formation of a Monetary Allocation Committee that would be 
accountable to the Treasury and Parliament but separate from the Bank of 
England’s existing Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). The new committee would 
decide how best to allocate new QE funding and any reinvestment of maturing 
gilts (almost £100bn are being repaid over the next five years). The committee 
would be charged with carefully examining different sectors of the economy 
and spare capacity within them. It would make allocation judgements based 
on a broad range of macroeconomic and policy criteria, such as sustainable 
GDP growth, employment, financial stability, the trade balance and inflation 
and ecological sustainability. Meanwhile, the independent MPC would remain 
in charge of determining the quantity of Bank of England reserves created and 
remain accountable for inflation. This would maintain an appropriate separation 
of powers and ensure that inflation expectations remained anchored. 
We have already entered the world of monetary policy activism; let’s make it as 
effective, transparent and accountable as possible.
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1.1 What this report is about
We are caught on the horns of a dilemma. After the bursting of a credit-fuelled 
bubble, we want our banks to shrink and repair their balance sheets. But at the 
same time we want them to expand credit to fund investment in the real economy. 
Large corporations, who have cash, seemingly lack the confidence to invest or 
expand production. Meanwhile, the Government is cutting expenditure to try to 
reduce its deficit. So where will the money come from to kick-start the economy? 
In this report we suggest a solution. Most people perhaps are still not aware that 
our money supply is created primarily by commercial banks, and hence shrinking 
banks means less money flowing into the economy. The inelegant phrase 
‘quantitative easing (QE)’, on the other hand, has certainly entered the popular 
consciousness. Public institutions, in the shape of the Bank of England, can create 
money, too. So far it has created £375 billion under the QE programme, prompting 
two crucial questions: How well has this worked? and Could we do better?
We argue that the use of the Bank of England’s powers, through QE and other 
schemes, has not been effective in stimulating an economic recovery. Neither will 
it contribute to the Government’s stated objective of rebalancing the economy 
towards manufacturing and exports. We explain why this is the case, in theory and 
in practice. 
We propose that the programme of QE be modified to be less scattergun and 
more strategic. Specifically we propose that it directly finance investment in the 
real economy. Importantly, we address the valid concern that unconventional 
monetary policy might be subverted by short-term political pressures, risking loss 
of control of inflation.
In essence, the solution is to mandate the Bank of England to act more like a 
bank.
1. Introduction: public money for public good 
When banks extend loans to their customers, they create money 
by crediting their customers’ accounts. The usual role of a central 
bank is to limit this rate of money creation, so that an excessive 
expansion of money spending does not lead to inflation. But a 
damaged banking system means that today banks aren’t creating 
enough money. We have to do it for them. 
Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, October 20123
[E]specially as fiscal policy becomes constrained by budget 
stringency … monetary policy is the main instrument for affecting 
macroeconomic performance. That this key determinant of what 
happens to society – this key collective action – should be so 
removed from control of the democratically elected officials should 
at least raise questions.
Joseph Stiglitz, 19984 
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1.2 Structure of the report
In Section 2, we briefly outline the basics of the role of banks, governments, and 
the central bank in the business of lending and money creation. We highlight the 
significance for economic performance when bank credit is abnormally constrained, 
and then describe key issues facing the UK economy. We outline the economic 
strategy of the Government since 2010, i.e. to combine fiscal consolidation with 
monetary activism, and examine some of the innovations in monetary policy that 
have taken place in response to the financial crisis.
In Section 3, we explain the economic theory of QE and the institutional 
arrangements for its implementation. We dispel some popular myths about what 
it is and how it works. The Bank of England is neither printing money nor giving it 
away to the banks or anyone else. In essence it is extending a very large long-term 
and very low interest loan to a newly created body – the Asset Purchase Facility – 
which has used this almost entirely to purchase government bonds.
The impact of QE, and other unconventional policy measures, is assessed 
in Section 4. We examine a range of empirical evidence, including our own 
econometric analysis of the primary drivers of nominal gross domestic product 
(GDP).
Based on this analysis, in Section 5 we set out two proposals for more targeted 
use of QE to achieve greater impact on nominal GDP and specific macroeconomic 
variables, such as production and employment. We conclude that the purchase 
of bonds in institutions with specific investment mandates for small and medium 
enterprise (SME) lending, infrastructure, and housing construction is both viable and 
desirable.
In Section 6, we consider reforms to institutional arrangements that recognise the 
blurring of fiscal and monetary policy that has already taken place, and that can 
better accommodate the competent execution of more strategic QE. We propose 
the creation of a Monetary Allocation Committee and a separation of powers 
between it and the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC).
Section 7 concludes.
Strategic quantitative easing 5
2.1 Who creates money? 
In modern capitalist societies such as the UK, the vast majority of new money, 
around 97 per cent, is created by commercial banks. When banks extend credit they 
add brand new electronic deposits to the borrowers’ accounts.5 This has profound 
economic consequences, as Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, alludes 
to. If commercial banks decrease their net lending6 to households and businesses, the 
flow of new money into the economy falls and fewer economic transactions can take 
place. The economy will contract. Since 2007, this is exactly what has happened. There 
has been a huge decline in money created for the real economy7 and whilst the rate of 
growth in lending has stabilised, it remains negative for businesses and well below its 
historical 5 per cent growth average (Figure 1).
Understanding the money-creation process is crucial to understanding the dilemma 
currently faced by the UK economy. We are overburdened with private debt, public 
debt has risen rapidly as a result of the banking crisis and recession, and yet there 
is too little money flowing through those parts of the economy that will generate 
investment and consumption, and thereby production and jobs. The key to this is the 
impact of credit on different sectors of the economy. When a new bank deposit is 
created, it matters enormously in whose hands the deposit is, and what they intend 
to do with it. It is possible for banks to reduce overall lending while increasing lending 
for investment and consumption.8 Reducing credit to businesses and householders 
means taking money out of the real economy, thereby depressing economic activity. 
It is the latter course that we have been following, as Figure 1 demonstrates.
The Government is prevented under EU legislation9 from to making up for this 
shortfall in bank lending by requiring the central bank to purchase newly issued 
government bonds. This system is intended to exert financial discipline on 
governments to prevent their access to central bank ‘printing presses’ with potentially 
dire inflationary consequences. However, the current practice of QE has severely 
reduced the meaning of such legislation. Furthermore, alongside the examples of 
the Weimar Republic in the 1920s and Zimbabwe in the 2000s which are often 
cited as ‘proof’ that government control of money creation is always and inevitably 
hyperinflationary, there are many historical examples of governments directly creating 
debt-free money responsibly and with good effect, but the debate around sovereign 
money is not for this report.10,11
So the Government does not directly print money, which, like the issuance of coins, 
could be considered as an asset rather than a liability of the state. Instead, the 
Government increases spending by borrowing more from financial markets, thereby 
increasing national debt. It has indeed massively increased borrowing since the start 
of the crisis, mainly to meet the costs of bailing out banks and the wider costs of 
recession, such as unemployment, housing benefits, and tax credits. 
However, government borrowing does not have the same effect as the money 
creation process that banks carry out. The same purchasing power is being put to a 
different use, and so rather than creating new money, the Government is reallocating 
existing money.12 
2. Money, credit, and economic policy
The financial crisis of 2008 and the resulting recession have 
refocused attention on the role of bank credit in stimulating the 
economy. In order to review the interventions of the Government 
and central bank in context, we need to briefly examine the 
significance of money creation and how this relates to economic 
policy and performance in the UK.
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The Bank of England, unlike the Government, has the power to create money 
both in the form of tangible paper money that circulates in the economy, and 
also in the form of loans, just as commercial banks do. But the amount of 
physical cash circulating is limited by the decreasing preference to hold cash, 
which now accounts for only 3% of the total money supply. QE has not been 
aimed at increasing cash and so it is incorrect to describe it as ‘printing money’. 
Instead, the process of QE essentially involves the Bank of England extending 
a very large loan to the Asset Purchase Facility (APF), which uses the money to 
buy assets. This process does not create permanent new debt-free money, as 
for instance the issuance of state money would, and hence it is also misleading 
to describe it as printing money even in a metaphorical sense. The intention is 
for the loan to be repaid in full, at which point the money will be drained back 
out of the economy in the same way as when commercial bank loans are repaid. 
Those who describe QE as printing money must logically also describe a new 
loan from the Royal Bank of Scotland, or any other commercial bank, as printing 
money. We will describe how QE works in detail in Section 3.
2.2 UK economic policy and performance
It has now been more than five years since the 2007/2008 financial crisis. Yet 
the economy shows little sign of recovery – indeed this has been the slowest 
recovery from a major recession in two centuries,13 worse than the Great 
Depression. After 64 months, GDP remains 2.6 per cent below its 2007 pre-crisis 
level, a loss of output that the Bank of England has compared to a World War.14 
Of the G20 club of large economies, only Italy has fared worse than the UK in 
the post crisis-period.15 
In response, the Government’s economic policy since 2010 has been to 
combine fiscal consolidation with monetary activism. 
Figure 1. Bank lending to businesses and households, 2000–2013.
Source: Bank of England, Funding for Lending Measure, code LPMV6PI
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P	 Fiscal consolidation involves cutting public spending in the hope of reducing 
the ‘structural’ deficit (the cyclically adjusted difference between spending 
and income over the course of a year) and eventually bringing down the 
public-debt-to-GDP ratio. 
P	 Monetary activism involves the Bank of England creating effectively negative 
real interest rates to entice households, banks, and companies to start 
spending or lending rather than saving or paying back debts (de-leveraging).
The theory is that the private sector will ‘take up the slack’ and invest as the 
public sector reduces spending, and international markets will keep interest 
rates low. Private sector employment (mainly in the service sector) has been 
expanding in recent years but research suggests much of these jobs are part-
time or held by self-employed workers who in previous, less severe downturns 
might have pulled out of the workforce completely to search for full-time work.16 
The unemployment rate remains high at 8 per cent suggesting considerable 
slack in the economy. 
But, as the Government has repeatedly stated, the UK economy also needs to 
rebalance. Instead of growth coming primarily from the service, financial, and  
public sectors, it should come from the productive sectors – high-value 
manufacturing and other export-orientated industries – to help improve the UK 
trade balance, which has stayed stubbornly in deficit since the late 1990s17 – and 
from construction and infrastructure investment to create the platform for longer-
term productivity increases. The latest data show little sign of recovery in those 
key sectors; rather they continue to contract (Figure 2). The level of industrial 
production in Britain is now at the lowest level since 1991 and around 15 per 
cent below the pre-recession peak.18
Figure 2. Change in real output by sector since financial crisis, rebased (2007=100).19
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Ironically, even in the face of the most severe austerity policies since World War 
II,20 it is government and other services which show the highest levels of growth. 
Recent decisions suggest that the Government believes that the quickest way 
to reflate the economy is by getting banks to extend more mortgages. This is 
suggested by both the Funding for Lending Scheme (Section 3.4) on behalf of 
the Bank and the ‘Help to Buy’ scheme announced in the Spring Budget.21 
From a macroeconomic perspective, this policy appears misguided for a number 
of reasons. First, it involves creating even more private debt. The Coalition 
Government has focused its attention on the UK’s public debt and the deficit. 
But the reality is that the UK has a private debt problem. Private debt is currently 
over 400 per cent of GDP whilst public debt is just 80 per cent. Household debt 
stands at 100 per cent of GDP.22 
Secondly, as the Office of Budget Responsibility, amongst others, has 
suggested, the policy risks inflating another housing bubble if the new credit 
is not matched by an increase in the supply of new homes, and there is little 
evidence of this being forthcoming (Section 5). Academic studies across 
different countries and time periods show large increases in household credit to 
be a strong predictor of financial crises and volatility.23,24
Thirdly, households generally spend credit on consumption not on investment. 
This will not help rebalance the economy or address the UK’s trade deficit 
(Figure 4). Buying new cars or carrying out home improvement mainly 
involves importing goods from abroad. Studies of the impact of increases in 
household credit show strong evidence that it leads to deterioration in the trade 
balance.25,26 
Fourthly, as argued in a recent nef report on macroeconomic strategy,27 the 
UK needs to find a way of weaning itself off a reliance on flows of footloose 
international capital to prop up the economy and fund our current account 
deficit. 
The need for a domestic source of investment and productive credit creation 
is even greater when we consider the state of the UK banking sector. Whilst 
households and businesses hold a dangerously large amount of total debt, 
the most serious concern is the financial sector which remains hamstrung by 
non-preforming assets and the need for banks to shrink their balance sheets and 
rebuild levels of core capital.
On a theoretical level, it is well-established that domestic investment is the 
driver of economic growth. For this to take place, funds are needed. At the same 
time, there is ample evidence that firms, especially SMEs, are credit rationed 
and would like to borrow more for investment than they are currently receiving.28 
However, who provides the funds is also important. Government initiatives to 
obtain direct funding by investors, for instance via tax-advantaged venture capital 
schemes, or by encouraging equity issuance, cannot substitute for bank credit: 
such ‘direct’ finance merely transfers existing purchasing power. Bank credit 
creation, on the other hand, expands the effective money supply and ensures 
that more purchasing power is being exerted.29 However, even bank credit 
creation may not necessarily be the answer: it can be extended for transactions 
that do not contribute to GDP (financial transactions that influence asset prices), 
for unproductive consumption (boosting inflation), or for productive investment 
delivering growth.30 Only the latter type of bank credit creation is sustainable 
and comes without undue cost to society, especially when productivity is 
defined to be consistent with environmental and ecological imperatives.
In summary then, what is required is a massive investment of domestic capital  
in the productive sector. As we shall see, however, the Bank of England’s £375 
billion programme of asset purchases – and other interventions – has failed to 
provide such a stimulus. We turn next to a description of monetary policy and 
how it has developed since the financial crisis, before we examine the theory of 
QE in Section 3.
Strategic quantitative easing 9
2.3 Monetary policy and central bank operations
In much of the media reporting of QE and other central bank activity, you will 
read phrases like ‘printing money’ or ‘giving money to the banks’. These are 
misleading expressions. The Bank of England is a bank, but one with unique 
characteristics and responsibilities that we describe in this section. 
2.3.1 Central bank interaction with banks
Just like commercial banks, the Bank of England has a balance sheet with 
assets and liabilities, and just like commercial banks it can create money by 
making loans. There are important differences however:
P	 Commercial banks create bank deposits (commercial bank money or 
broad money), i.e. the type of money used by everyone in the economy. 
The amount of money that any individual bank can create is determined by 
regulatory constraints, balance sheet constraints (their liquidity and capital 
positions), institutional and financial infrastructure constraints (whether 
they can access funding in wholesale and capital markets), the internal 
management and incentive structure (such as the bonus culture, etc.), and 
by their confidence in the economy.
P	 The central bank creates bank reserves at the central bank (narrow money 
or base money, henceforth referred to as ‘central bank reserves’), which 
is a type of money that can only be used by commercial banks to make 
payments between themselves. Although sometimes referred to as ‘money’ 
(narrow money or reserve money), central bank reserves are not money that 
is available to households and businesses to use and rather than circulating 
in the economy they stay on the central bank balance sheet. The amount of 
central bank reserves the central bank can create is constrained only by the 
need to maintain confidence in the currency itself. Unlike commercial banks, 
the central bank has no liquidity, capital, or funding constraints.
As shown in Figure 3, when the central bank makes a loan to a commercial 
bank, it simultaneously creates central bank reserves for the commercial bank. 
For the commercial bank, its holding of central bank reserves in an account at 
the Bank of England is very much like our holdings of bank deposits at our own 
bank. The commercial bank pays interest to borrow these reserves. The rate of 
interest is the ‘bank rate’ or ‘policy rate’ which the Bank of England meets to 
discuss every quarter and which makes a lot of news since it affects all the other 
interest rates in the economy. These reserves can be used to settle payments 
between banks when customers transfer deposits. They are thus vital to the 
heath of the economy.
The Bank of England has another important function: acting as the 
Government’s banker. In this role the Bank of England holds and thus has 
access to the Government’s reserve account and hence the Debt Management 
Office (DMO). It can borrow and return government bonds from the DMO, 
which it can then lend to banks. Government debt instruments have a range of 
maturities, ranging from 25 years down to just three months (the latter called 
Treasury bills or T-bills). The Bank of England is able to borrow T-bills from the 
Government and lend them to commercial banks. This activity does not involve 
the creation of new reserves but helps commercial banks to manage their 
liquidity effectively. Commercial banks can easily trade T-bills for central bank 
reserves in the interbank market. 
Figure 3. Balance sheet interaction between a central bank and a 
commercial bank
Commercial Banks Central Bank
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
What borrowers  
owe to the bank
What the bank  
owes to customers
Loan to customers Depoits of customers Loans to  
private banks
Reserve deposits  
of private banks
+ Central bank reserves + Loans from central bank
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When you get a mortgage from a bank, you have to pledge some form of collateral 
in return (usually the house itself) as well as paying interest to the bank. In just the 
same way, when the central bank makes a loan of central bank reserves or T-bills, 
it also takes collateral. In this case the collateral will be another financial asset on 
the commercial bank’s balance sheet. The central bank today prefers only very ‘high 
quality’ assets as collateral, usually government bonds (gilts) or investment grade 
corporate bonds (i.e. corporate bonds that would easily sell on financial markets). 
As we shall see, however, central banks are free to purchase or accept as collateral 
any kind of assets they wish, and have done so throughout history for a range of 
different objectives. The European Central Bank (ECB) currently accepts various 
kinds of assets, including loans, as collateral from banks. 
It should be noted that the Bank of England, just like a commercial bank, will want 
to have the option of calling in its loan at some future point in time. It can achieve 
this easily by using repurchase agreements (repos) and reverse repurchase 
agreements (reverse repos). When the Bank of England conducts a repo it sells an 
asset, such as a T-bill, to the bank in exchange for central bank reserves, but with a 
legal agreement to buy the asset back again after a set period of time. This process 
of lending and withdrawing reserves on a fairly short-term basis is called Open 
Market Operations (OMOs). They have been a tool of central banks’ monetary policy 
since their inception.31 As the Bank of England itself has noted: 
There is nothing unusual about central banks purchasing assets per se… 
QE is just a return to the classic policy operation of the textbook: an open 
market operation. The only things that distinguish the present operation… 
are the circumstances under which they are taking place and their scale.32
The difference between a central bank and a commercial bank is that that a central 
bank will make decisions about creating central bank reserves based on the 
stability of the banking system and other broad macroeconomic concerns, whilst a 
commercial bank’s creation of bank deposits is simply dictated by its own efforts to 
maximise profits. As already noted, the rate of interest that the Bank of England will 
charge on short-term loans to commercial banks is known as the official bank rate, 
or base rate, and manipulating this interest rate is the primary tool of conventional 
monetary policy. 
2.3.2 Conventional monetary policy
The objective of monetary policy is said to be primarily to achieve price stability, 
often defined as a low and stable rate of inflation. The Bank of England is tasked 
with keeping inflation at 2 per cent over the medium term. Sometimes broader 
macroeconomic goals are included, such as the US central bank’s twin objectives 
of achieving maximum sustainable output and price stability.
Modern monetary policy is conducted mainly through adjustments to interest 
rates. The official description is along the following lines: when the central bank 
believes that the economy is heating up, it will raise interest rates to dampen 
economic activity. Conversely, if too little economic activity is taking place, the Bank 
of England will lower the bank rate on the basis that, since interest rates are the 
driving force of economic activity, this will stimulate growth.
This theory is contested and there is evidence that interest rates tend to follow, not 
lead, economic growth and are positively correlated with it.33,34 Nevertheless, even 
if we accept the theory, a problem arises when interest rates have been lowered so 
many times – and without the desired effect – that they approach zero. The same 
economic theory would then suggest that interest rates would need to fall below 
zero, becoming negative – in effect punishing banks for holding reserves with the 
central bank by requiring them to pay a fee. This is widely described as interest 
rates ‘reaching the zero lower bound’. In such a situation, commonly termed a 
‘liquidity trap’, the core mechanism of monetary policy seems to fall apart.
2.3.3 Japanese deflation and the origins of QE
When the Bank of Japan faced this situation in the 1990s, it stuck rigidly to the 
conventional view that ever further interest reductions were necessary and the only 
policy available. However, when it had reduced short-term interest rates from 7% at 
the beginning of the 1990s to 0.001 per cent at the end of it, the results were not 
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impressive: Japan remained mired in deflation. Thus, in March 2001, the Bank 
of Japan adopted a new policy of significantly expanding the quantity of central 
bank reserves in the hope of boosting bank lending. This policy was based on 
monetarist theory (Box 1) which was common among central banks in the early 
1980s, but abandoned due to its ineffectiveness.35 
Unfortunately this massive expansion in the quantity of central bank reserves 
was no more effective in stimulating an economic recovery than the previous 
cuts in interest rates had been. However, the label used by the Bank of Japan 
for the policy – quantitative easing – caught the imagination of investors and 
commentators. Ironically the term was originally defined by one of the authors 
of this report to mean expanding credit creation (not central bank reserves).36 
Nevertheless base money expansion is now commonly referred to as 
‘quantitative easing’, or QE.
2.3.4 UK monetary policy since the financial crisis
As shown in Figure 4, the bank has expanded its balance by a factor of five in 
the five years since the financial crisis. What does this mean? The expansion 
can be thought of in two distinct phases. The first phase, from the end of 2007 
until the end of 2009, was mainly about stabilising the financial system by 
injecting a massive amount of liquidity (central bank reserves or Treasury bills) 
into the banking system following the credit crunch and the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008. Once the system stabilised, the second phase, 
from 2010 onwards, has been about trying to kick-start the economy. Several 
difference types of intervention have taken place:
Longer-term sterling reverse repos (green shading Figure 4) represent the 
Bank of England expanding the purchases of assets at the height of the financial 
crisis. The Bank of England also expanded the type of collateral it would accept 
in exchange for three-month Treasury Bills from high-quality sovereign securities 
to include AAA-rated residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and 
covered bonds. Initially, these extended-collateral long-term repos (ELTRs) were 
offered in monthly auctions of £10 billion, with the sizes of subsequent auctions 
reflecting financial market conditions at the time. In particular, in the wake of the 
disruption to the global financial system in the autumn of 2008, these operations 
were offered in greater size and at greater frequency, and the range of eligible 
collateral was further expanded to include securities backed by commercial 
mortgage assets and corporate debt. At their peak during January 2009, the 
Box 1. Monetarism and the money multiplier myth
Monetarism, commonly associated with the economist Milton Friedman, is a school of economic thought which 
emphasises the need for governments to control the quantity of money in circulation in order to stabilise the economy 
and prevent excessive inflation or deflation. However, by ‘money’, monetarists historically meant central bank reserves 
(and notes and coins) rather than credit from commercial banks. Initial monetarist theory rested on the existence of the 
‘money multiplier’ to allow control over bank credit. This theory suggested that there is a mathematical link between 
the quantity of base money and bank deposits in the economy. Since banks need reserves in order to settle payments 
with each other, they will only create credit in relation to the reserves they possess. So by expanding base money, the 
central bank can increase credit and vice versa. 
The money multiplier theory is not supported by evidence, however. First, deregulation of the financial sector means 
that banks have no obligation to hold any ratio of reserves to deposits. Secondly, the historical record shows us that 
banks tend to lend on the basis of their confidence in the borrower and perceived profitability and then seek out the 
necessary reserves required to settle any payments after making the loan. 
Indeed the experience of monetarist policies in the UK confirms this. When the policy of ‘monetary base control’ 
proved ineffective at controlling bank credit, monetarist policies evolved to attempt control the growth of Sterling M3, 
a broader measure of the money supply, through manipulating interest rates.
Central banks now widely see the money multiplier theory as outdated, agreeing that money creation is ‘endogenous’ 
– i.e. it cannot be controlled by the central bank through altering the quantity of central bank reserves.
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stock of outstanding ELTRs reached £180 billion.37 The Bank of England also 
bought commercial paper (shorter-term corporate debt) in significant amounts in 
2009 (see ‘other assets’ in Figure 4).
In April 2009, in a bid to unfreeze the money markets, i.e. encourage interbank 
short-term lending of reserves, the Bank of England launched a Special 
Liquidity Scheme (SLS). The SLS allowed UK banks, for a fee, to borrow short-
term UK Government Treasury bills from the Bank of England in exchange 
for posting mortgage-backed securities as collateral, i.e. it gave banks the 
opportunity to borrow highly liquid T-bills for up to three years.38 The window 
during which banks could borrow from the Bank of England was originally only 
open for six months, but was then extended for an additional three months due 
to high demand from the banks and continuing low levels of interbank lending 
(and, unofficially, to help facilitate the Lloyds-HBOS merger). The SLS officially 
closed on 30 January 2012. All drawings under the scheme were repaid before 
the scheme closed.
In March 2009, the Bank of England commenced a programme of large-scale 
asset purchases (the light blue in Figure 4) funded through the creation of 
new central bank reserves. It adopted the term QE for this policy and it was 
introduced following the same logic as in Japan: the base rate had reached 0.5 
per cent – the lowest level in the Bank of England’s history – and the economy 
was still contracting. 
Between 2009 and September 2012, the Bank of England created £375 billion 
of central bank reserves (25 per cent of GDP) through four successive rounds 
of QE; £200 billion between March and November 2009; £75 billion between 
October 2011 and January 2012; £50 billion between February and May 2012; 
and £50 billion announced in July 2012. 
In the next section we explain the purpose of QE and set out the impact that it 
should have, in theory, on the economy.
Figure 4. Bank of England assets, 2007–2012.
Source: Bank of England
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3.1 How QE works
In January 2009 the Bank of England, together with the Treasury, created a new 
vehicle for carrying out the QE programme of assets purchases – called the 
Asset Purchase Facility (APF). When the MPC takes a decision to conduct more 
QE, the Bank of England creates new electronic central bank reserves and 
lends them to the APF by simply adding these numbers to the APF’s account. 
It is important to note that the Bank of England has made a loan, and that the 
intention is that at some point the loan will be repaid and these new reserves 
will be withdrawn from the economy. For this reason the phrase ‘printing money’ 
is very misleading as it implies the permanent creation of new interest-free 
money, not the temporary creation of money through making a loan at interest. 
In this sense, the Bank of England is no more printing money than RBS is when 
it extends credit to its customers.39 
The process is best understood through the use of accounting T-charts (Figure 
5). The Bank of England makes a loan to the APF which uses this to purchase 
gilts (step 1) from the non-bank investment sector, such as from a pension fund 
(step 2). The pension fund’s holdings of gilts are reduced, with a corresponding 
increase in its holdings of commercial bank deposits. This is a change in the 
composition of the assets in the pension fund, with no change to its liabilities 
(step 3). The pension fund’s bank gains additional central bank reserves from 
the APF on the asset side of its balance sheet and a matching increase in 
deposits on the liability side as it credits the pension fund’s bank account  
(step 4). 
In summary, the new money (bank deposits) created through this process is 
now in the hands of the pension fund. QE as practised by the Bank of England 
creates new bank deposits for investors in the capital markets. But, as we shall 
see, these deposits will only translate into increased demand in the economy if 
they feed through to GDP-related transactions. 
3.2 Who runs the Asset Purchase Facility?
The Bank of England Asset Purchase Facility Fund Limited (APF) is a subsidiary 
company wholly owned by the Bank of England. However, the Bank of England 
is indemnified by the Treasury against any losses by the APF (unlike assets 
held directly on the Bank of England’s own balance sheet). This means that 
if bonds purchased by the APF are not repaid, or the APF sells assets for less 
than price it paid for them, the taxpayer rather than the Bank of England will be 
liable for the shortfall. In one sense then, one can view the assets in the APF as 
belonging to the Government.40 This arrangement allows the Bank of England 
to not consolidate the APF into its own balance sheet. However, government 
accounting rules mean that the APF does not appear in the public accounts 
either. Effectively the APF is a giant off-balance-sheet vehicle, although the 
Bank of England does publish an annual report and accounts for the APF as 
well as other regular operational data.
The creation of the APF enables the Bank of England to keep a clear distinction 
between QE and more standard OMOs although essentially the same activity 
is taking place. The APF can purchase assets funded either by borrowing T-bills 
3. Understanding QE in theory 
What is QE and how is it supposed to work? There is much 
misinformation and confusion surrounding this question and, before 
we examine the impact of QE in Section 4, we will first attempt to 
set out clearly the purpose and mechanism of QE and other central 
bank interventions that are intended to support the economy.
Figure 5. Quantitative Easing  
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from the Bank of England or by using central bank reserves created by the Bank 
of England under the QE programme. 
Members of the independent MPC decide on the quantity of assets that will be 
purchased by the APF using Central Bank reserves. However, the APF itself is 
staffed by Directors of the Bank of England and it is they, rather than the MPC, 
who determine what type of assets will be bought by the APF.41 Specifically, 
the Bank’s Executive Directors for Markets and Monetary Analysis and Statistics 
make recommendations on the assets to be purchased to the Governor of the 
Bank, who decides after consulting with the two Deputy Governors.42 
Whilst the general public probably associates QE with the purchase of 
government bonds, initially it was intended that corporate bonds be purchased 
by the APF in exchange for Treasury bills. Only in February of 2009 was it agreed 
that government bonds could also be purchased by the Bank of England, just 
prior to the commencement of the large-scale purchase of assets funded by 
new central bank reserves. The initial perceived importance of buying private 
sector assets at the time is clear in Mervyn King’s letter to the Chancellor:
In order to facilitate an expansion of the monetary base through the Asset 
Purchase Facility, the MPC proposes that gilt-edged securities be added 
to the list of eligible assets set out in your letter of 29 January. I suggest 
that the MPC be authorised to use the facility to purchase eligible assets 
financed by central bank money up to a maximum of £150 billion but that, 
in line with the current arrangements and in recognition of the importance 
of supporting the flow of corporate credit, up to £50 billion of that should 
be used to purchase private sector assets. Within those limits, the speed 
and scale of purchases would be for the Committee to decide.
Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England43
Since this announcement however, the APF that has taken the decision to 
purchase almost exclusively gilts, rather than any other kind of asset, such as 
corporate bonds. We explain the significance of this decision next.
3.3 Theoretical impact of QE 
Figure 6 shows how QE could or should affect the economy. It is a complicated 
process. The blue boxes (and corresponding arrows) are intermediate steps 
where the outcome is indeterminate. The Bank of England is ultimately interested 
in achieving the outcomes in the green boxes – they all involve the creation of 
new GDP transactions and hence GDP growth. However, such outcomes are 
uncertain and it would appear just as likely, if not more so, that the red outcomes 
have occurred, given the current economic conditions. There are two main 
channels through which QE is thought to impact on the economy; the bank 
lending channel and the portfolio rebalancing effect. 
3.3.1 The portfolio rebalancing effect
The Bank of England has placed the most emphasis on the impact of QE on 
changes in investors’ portfolios. As shown in Figure 6, the process is somewhat 
drawn out. Purchase of gilts from financial investors by the APF creates new 
deposits for those investors. The increase in central bank reserves (narrow 
money) has led to an equal increase in bank deposits (broad money).44 The 
important question for assessing the macroeconomic impact is what they will 
do with these deposits. The theory is that this ‘shock’ to their portfolio will lead 
to investors rebalancing their holdings by seeking out similar kinds of financial 
assets (Box 2).45,46 They may want to do this for a number of reasons. 
First, government bonds, particularly longer dated gilts (e.g. 10 or 25 years) will 
have a higher rate of return than deposits. Secondly, certain kinds of investors, in 
particular pension funds, will want to hold assets of longer maturity than deposits 
as they have correspondingly long-dated liabilities.47 
The hope is that investors will switch instead to corporate assets – bonds or 
equities (shares) – that will in turn support businesses operating in the real 
economy. However, investors have other options, as shown in the red boxes. 
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P	 They may choose to switch into foreign government bonds instead.48 
P	 They may simply buy existing corporate securities from other investors rather 
than newly issued securities from companies. Only in the latter case, known as 
the primary market, will companies receive more funds and this is only a fraction 
of the overall turnover of capital markets. We examine the impact on corporate 
investment later. 
P	 They may choose to invest in derivatives based on commodities such as oil or 
food, which will have the effect of inflating the prices of these assets.49
P	 They may in the end choose to sit on their cash, in which case the newly 
created money will have made no contribution to GDP whatsoever.
Let us assume that investors choose to purchase newly issued corporate assets. 
This will bring down the cost of issuing new equity or bonds for firms and mean it is 
likely they will be able to access more finance. However, it is then up to the firms to 
decide what to spend this new money on. It will only contribute to GDP transactions 
Figure 6. The effect of QE on the UK economy.
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and growth if it is invested in new production. In the current environment, it appears 
larger firms are happier just sitting on cash. The Office of National Statistics recently 
estimated that the UK companies were sitting on £750 billion in cash, 50 per cent 
of GDP.51 Or companies might use the funds to pay down existing bank loans. This 
will have the paradoxical effect of reducing the money supply.
3.3.2 The wealth effect
An additional potential consequence of portfolio rebalancing is known as the 
‘wealth effect’. As investors buy more equities this should push up their price, 
meaning holders of these assets will feel wealthier. They may choose to invest this 
additional wealth in consumption which would contribute to GDP growth (although 
it may not help the trade deficit if it involves buying goods that are imported). 
However, again it is not clear that asset holders will do this. They might just buy 
other kinds of existing assets or save the money. Academic research shows that 
wealthier individuals tend to be less likely to spend any additional income on 
consumption.52 Furthermore the impact on consumption for any consumer will 
depend on whether they feel it is a long-term or merely a short-term improvement 
in their economic position, and how the current increase in wealth affects their 
confidence about their future financial prospects. It is also possible that banks, 
which also hold assets, will also feel a ‘wealth effect’ because the value of their 
capital will rise. They may then pass on this effect via charging lower rates of 
interest.53
3.3.3 The bank lending channel
As commercial banks hold significantly higher levels of central bank reserves as a 
result of QE, it is possible that additional liquidity and reduced cost of funding will 
enable banks to increase their lending to the real economy, creating credit for new 
GDP transactions. David Miles, a member of the MPC, in a speech in October 2011, 
stated that: 
When the Bank of England purchases gilts owned by non-banks, all else 
equal, banks’ deposits rise as do reserve balances at the central bank. To 
the extent that a bank’s reserve holdings would then come to exceed its 
demand for liquidity, it is likely to be more willing to expand lending. Or, if a 
bank had already lost some of its other funding, it might be able to avoid a 
contraction in its lending or a sale of less liquid assets.54
Box 2: Government versus corporate bonds
Government bonds are the safest and most liquid form of financial asset, with the exception of cash or central bank 
reserves. This is because governments very rarely (in the UK’s case, never) default on their debts, in contrast for 
example to businesses (corporate bonds). The rate on government debt is thus often known as the ‘risk-free’ rate of 
return. The desired return for investing in corporate bonds is the addition of the risk-free rate and the risk premium. Of 
course, different people have different risk premia, depending on their own tolerance for risk and the companies they 
are buying into. In general, however, as the risk-free rate goes up, the total return required for investing in corporate 
bonds also increases and vice versa. At times of economic instability and declining corporate profitability, the risk 
premia rises and the risk-free rate falls as investors turn to safer government debt. If corporate bond issuance to fund 
investment becomes more difficult, this will be bad news for the economy, especially if, as at the present time, banks 
and households are deleveraging rather than offering and taking out new credit. 
QE involves the Bank of England trading one type of relatively safe IOU – gilts – for another: Bank of England reserves 
which pays a lower rate of interest. The Bank of England targeted its purchases at the non-bank private sector – for 
example, pension funds and insurance companies. It did this by buying gilts of longer maturity (3, 5, 10, or 25 years) 
than the types banks would normally hold.50 As with any market, the purchases have the effect of increasing the 
demand for gilts relative to supply, thus pushing up their price. At the same time, this has the effect of pushing down 
the return that holders of such assets receive, known as the yield-to-maturity. This is because government bonds are 
fixed-income assets – they pay out the same total amount in every period, known as the coupon. So the price and the 
interest rate on gilts are inversely linked. As the demand for them and their price increases, the rate of return received 
on them decreases. 
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The first phase of QE in 2009, when £200 billion was injected in the space of just 
six months, may have supported bank lending, or at least prevented a further fall 
in credit creation, although the Bank of England has played down this effect in its 
analysis.55 A number of other schemes aimed more directly at improving banks’ 
balance sheets were also underway at the time, including the Government 
guaranteeing bonds issued by the banks (the credit guarantee scheme56), the 
SLS, and the partial nationalisations of RBS and Lloyds via massive tax-payer-
funded re-capitalisations. These interventions would appear to support the 
banking system more directly and hence prevent further contractions in lending. 
Either way, the impact of expansion of central bank reserves on credit creation, 
as mentioned in Box 1, is indirect and dependent entirely on banks’ confidence. 
Their overall effect is likely to be limited, simply because banks were already 
holding excess reserves before the policy was adopted. It is not obvious that 
a significant increase in the amount of excess reserves will have any impact 
on banks’ lending decisions. This is especially true since, as discussed earlier, 
central bank reserves cannot in total be reduced by banks ‘lending the money’ 
– banks create new credit when they lend, for which they do not need reserves, 
and the reserves at the central bank cannot in aggregate be reduced by banks 
via any action of their own. Thus, in aggregate, banks must hold these large 
reserve balances, and they currently receive 0.5 per cent interest on them.57
3.4 Funding for Lending
The ‘portfolio’ effect of QE described above might help larger businesses 
who can issue equity and bonds but it does not help households or smaller 
businesses that are not large enough to access the capital markets. They are 
dependent, for larger loans at least, almost entirely on the banking sector. 
Realising that QE did not address the problem of bank credit-creation, the Bank 
of England introduced a new policy in July 2012 – the Funding for Lending 
(FLS) scheme. This scheme more directly targets the banks and their lending, 
rather than just creating new deposits in the financial sector. Banks create 
money by buying assets or making loans, but they have to fund these loans 
once the borrower spends the money. FLS lowers banks’ cost of funding if they 
commit to particular kinds of bank lending – that is lending to households and 
businesses.58 
To understand FLS, it’s necessary to understand what is meant by bank ‘funding’. 
When banks make loans, they also create deposits, as explained in Section 1. 
But deposits are short-term liabilities which can be withdrawn without notice – or 
‘on sight’. In contrast, banks’ loans – their assets – are typically longer term (e.g. 
a mortgage might be 25 years). So banks typically have a maturity ‘mis-match’. 
They fund long-term assets (loans) with short-term liabilities (deposits). 
This is not a problem so long as there is not a sudden rush to withdraw large 
quantities of electronic deposits from any particular bank or withdraw deposits 
in the form of cash (in which case these liabilities leaved the banking system 
entirely). However, at the present time banks are concerned about maturity mis-
match because there remain doubts about banks’ solvency following the financial 
crisis. This means banks are seeking to improve the maturity match between 
their assets and liabilities. So if a bank issues many 5-year business loans, they 
may want the assurance that a good proportion of their liabilities are ‘term debt’ 
(e.g. fixed-rate bonds that cannot be withdrawn for one or two years) rather than 
all being deposits. 
Banks access such term debt from the capital markets and since the financial 
crisis, the costs of such term debt have risen substantially as demand for longer 
term liabilities has gone up. This high cost of funding, also driven by problems in 
the Eurozone, makes banks reluctant to make more loans. Funding for Lending, 
together perhaps with the European Central Bank’s announcement that it would 
buy government bonds in whatever quantities were required to lower long-term 
yields (‘Outright Monetary Transactions) has helped to bring the costs of bank 
funding down.
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The FLS facilities are made for four years, i.e. once drawn down, the banks do 
not have to repay for four years. This means the banks would have no maturity 
mis-match risk on loans up to four years (which should cover the majority of 
SME loans), and would probably be happy to leverage up on that by funding 
additional loans from short-dated wholesale money. And obviously the funds 
should work out a lot cheaper for the commercial bank than going to the capital 
markets. 
In March, the Government announced changes to the FLS scheme to make it 
more orientated towards lending to SMEs rather than just for secured lending. 
The amount, and cost, of the cheap money offered through the FLS is linked to 
the degree to which banks expand their balance sheets by lending to the UK’s 
businesses and households. Under the changes, for every £1 that participants 
in the FLS expand lending to SMEs this year, the Bank of England will offer up 
to £10 of additional funds, compared with £1 for loans to households. For SME 
lending granted in 2014, the Bank of England will offer £5.
The scheme will now remain open for another year until the beginning of 2015. 
In the March announcement, the Treasury also stated that alternative providers of 
finance, such as financial leasing and factoring corporations, could be included 
in the definition of FLS lending for the first time.
FLS is in line with the disaggregated Quantity Theory Credit, as it explicitly aims 
to stimulate credit creation for GDP transactions rather than simply increasing 
reserves in the banking system.59 If borrowers use the funds for consumption 
(e.g. home improvement) then this will boost GDP. But if banks increase their 
mortgage lending the outcome in terms of nominal GDP growth is somewhat 
ambiguous. Mortgage lending may just increase house prices. If this happens, it 
is possible that there may be some wealth effect in the short term, encouraging 
more consumption, but in the long-term the higher monthly mortgage 
repayments suffered by new entrants to the housing market paying inflated 
house prices might reduce consumer demand. 
Only lending to businesses can be more reliably viewed as resulting in an 
increase in GDP transactions, without the negative effects of asset inflation or 
consumer price inflation. It is for this reason perhaps that the Bank of England 
chose in March 2013 to alter the terms of FLS to more specifically incentivize 
lending to SMEs over mortgage financing.60
To summarise, all of these channels are indirect and all of them attempt to 
stimulate the real economy by acting through the financial sector. Thus bond 
purchase operations by central banks, including what is styled as QE, do not 
create new credit or even deposits (purchasing power) directly in the hands of 
households, businesses, or the Government. New deposits are created in the 
non-bank financial (or investment) sector only. 
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Attribution issues arise when it is not possible to isolate the impact of 
one among many different causal factors. A number of other interventions 
occurred at the same time as QE: a historically unparalleled drop in interest 
rates, a massive increase in government spending as well as the liquidity 
and recapitalisation policies mentioned in Section 3. Other countries – the 
USA, Japan, and the Eurozone in particular – were also undertaking QE-type 
policies meaning there were likely to be spill-over effects, in particular given the 
internationalised nature of the UK economy. 
The counterfactual problem is that we can never know what would have 
happened if we had not carried out QE, so we can never truly know its impact. 
We can only observe how the economy has changed. QE was initiated during 
extraordinary economic times – with output and bank lending and confidence 
in stock-markets collapsing in a fashion not seen since the Great Depression. 
Finally, whilst analysis of changes in financial markets (asset prices, risk 
spreads) is fairly amenable to direct observation, this is less true for broader 
macroeconomic impacts where significant time lags may be present. 
It may be for the latter reason that the vast majority of empirical studies of QE, 
both in the UK and internationally, have concentrated on the impact of QE on 
changes in financial markets. Such studies have been criticised for missing the 
point; since the ultimate objective of QE was to boost nominal GDP and inflation, 
measuring such intermediate variables appears not very useful.62,63 In this 
section we review existing empirical studies, trying where possible to relate them 
to effects on the real economy, reviewing both the portfolio re-balancing and 
bank lending channels, including FLS, described in Section 3. We then examine 
the impact of QE on government debt and the distributional affects. Finally, we 
lay out our own analysis of potential drivers of growth in the UK economy from 
1990 to 2013, concluding that bank credit creation for the real economy is the 
most important determinant of GDP growth.
4.1. The portfolio re-balancing channel
4.1.1 Effect on gilt yields
QE does appear to have contributed to a lowering of medium- and long-
term government bond rates – the first phase of the portfolio rebalancing 
objectives outlined in Section 3.64,65 The Bank of England estimates that QE 
phase 1 reduced long-term gilt yields by around 100 basis points.66 However, 
econometric studies suggest these effects may only have been temporary and 
had most of their impact in the first round of QE in 2008/2009 at the height of 
the crisis.67 For later actions, it is particularly difficult to disentangle this effect 
from international dynamics that may affect foreign investors’ desire for UK 
bonds. Most obviously, the problems in the Eurozone have undoubtedly made 
gilts unusually attractive relative to Eurozone sovereign debt. Subsequent QE 
interventions might also appear to have had less of an impact because markets 
had already ‘priced in’ their probable occurrence.68,69 This ‘signalling channel’ 
– whereby the Bank of England makes its intention to buy up sovereign debt in 
large quantities – is inevitably likely to be stronger the first time the intervention 
was practised.
4. Assessing QE and Funding for Lending in practice
Studies by the Bank of England suggest that QE contributed around 
1.5 per cent to GDP growth at its peak and boosted annual inflation 
by around 1.25 per cent.61 The transmission mechanism from QE to 
these figures is very complex however. There are both attribution and 
counterfactual issues. 
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4.1.2 Effect on exchange rates 
Pushing down the availability and yield on UK Government bonds, and raising 
their price may lead investors to instead purchase foreign government bonds 
in order to maintain their portfolio risk and maturity profile, as described earlier. 
To do so they would need to exchange their sterling for foreign currency, which 
may put downward pressure on the exchange rate. The overall impact on sterling 
will depend on the actions of other players, such as central banks, however. If 
other central banks carry out similar purchases of their own sovereign debt, this 
may cancel out the exchange rate devaluation – the ‘beggar-my-neighbour’ (or 
‘currency war’) effect. 
Whilst sterling has depreciated 20 per cent since the crisis, much of this can 
be attributed to the sharp initial reduction in interest rates. Estimates by the 
Bank of England and others suggest that the direct effect of QE interventions 
on sterling is nearer 4 per cent.70 This could be seen to have made UK exports 
more competitive and foreign imports less competitive, increasing demand for 
domestic goods of services. Both these effects will boost GDP. This channel 
could be quite weak, however, for a number of reasons. First, imports may 
not fall, particularly if there are no domestic substitutes, and so the economy 
faces higher prices – the so-called ‘cost push’ inflation. Secondly, even with 
more competitive export prices, SMEs in particular may not be able to increase 
production without bank credit. Thirdly, the UK commercial sector is dominated 
by larger firms which invest abroad rather than export overseas.71 Finally, as 
noted earlier, even despite the fall in interest rates and sterling, foreign investors 
may have preferred sterling assets as the ‘best of a bad bunch’ during the 
Eurozone crisis. Specifically, demand for gilts might have been increased by the 
presence of a massive buyer in the gilt market (the APF) guaranteeing to support 
the price of gilts. This increased demand for sterling would have mitigated the 
depreciation effect of lower interest rates.
Figure 7. Equity prices and corporate bond yields.
Source: Bank of England
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4.1.3 Effect on price and issuance of corporate assets 
QE purchases of gilts appear to have helped boost equity prices which have 
recovered to pre-crisis levels (Figure 7).73 Bank of England research estimates 
that UK QE1 boosted equity prices by around 20 per cent.74 Again, however, 
it is difficult disentangle international effects. In particular, the FTSE 100 is 
closely correlated with the US Standard and Poor Index (S&P 500); it tracked 
this very closely during the first phase of QE, modestly outperforming it, and 
outperformed it more significantly in the second phase of QE by 2012.75
However, the new issuance of equity and bonds is a more important variable 
for the real economy than the price of assets. This is shown in Figure 8. Whilst 
there was a significant increase in equity issuance in 2009 (the blue bar), this 
was driven primarily by recapitalisation of the banking sector, with Lloyds alone 
launching the world’s biggest rights issue of £13.5 billion. Equity issuance 
has since gone negative in aggregate, indicating that the UK stock market 
has reverted to being a net recipient, rather than provider, of capital from the 
corporate sector and only bond issuance remained positive in 2012 and 2013. 
So the issuance of corporate assets has not compensated for the collapse in 
bank lending in absolute terms since the crisis (shown in orange), and even 
if the figure had been equal, such a shift from bank credit to ‘direct finance’ 
would still have a contractionary net effect on economic activity.76 Indeed, to 
the extent that companies are refinancing bank loans with corporate bond 
issuance, this will be further contributing to the contraction in the broad money 
supply.
4.2 The bank lending channel and Funding for Lending
Initial large-scale QE purchases helped to improve bank liquidity. Looking at 
the bare figures, reserves held by banks at the Bank of England have increased 
from £46 billion just before the start of QE1 to £290 billion at present. The 
inter-bank rate did fall significantly during the first phase of QE, suggesting 
the flood of liquidity restored the banks’ confidence in each other. In fact, UK 
banks’ holding of sterling liquid assets (cash plus reserves plus short-term 
government debt) are now at the highest since the late 1970s.77 However the 
problem is that whilst this increase in liquidity may have prevented a more 
severe contraction in lending, it has not stopped the contraction completely.
Figure 8. External financing of UK companies 2003–2012.
Source: Bank of England72
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Figure 9 shows the huge fall in the rate of growth of lending that occurred during 
the financial crisis, from the beginning of 2008 to the autumn of 2009, split by 
lending to households and individuals and to businesses (public non-financial 
corporations (PNFCs)). The first phase of QE involved the purchase of £200 billion 
of corporate and government bonds between March and November of 2009 and, 
along with the other schemes to recapitalise the banks, would appear to have 
played a role in stabilising lending to businesses and households. However, Figure 
9 shows, lending has since flat-lined in the case of lending to households and 
continues to contract in the case of business lending. 
Particular attention has been paid to banks failing to lend to SMEs. Despite the 
many schemes introduced by the Government and the Bank of England to boost 
lending to SMEs (the credit guarantee scheme, Project Merlin, and now FLS) 
there is little evidence of a recovery in lending, A recent comprehensive report 
commissioned by the Department of Business painted a bleak picture of rising 
rejection rates for both short- and longer-term financing for SMEs (Figure 10).79 
Figure 9. Lending to the real economy, 2003–2012.
Source: Bank of England78
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Figure 10. SME bank debt rejection rates (including renewals) 2001/2012.
Source: BIS/NIESR80
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Neither has the FLS so far created the pick-up in small business lending the 
Treasury and the Bank of England were hoping for (Figure 11).
There are a variety of explanations as to why banks have not used the scheme. 
The most obvious is that three of the UK’s major SME lenders, the partially 
nationalised RBS, Lloyds, and Santander, appear to be actively shrinking 
their loan books. Remarkably, in the first quarter of 2013, none of the four big 
banks (Barclays, Lloyds TSB, RBS, and Santander) used the FLS scheme at all. 
Meanwhile, whilst Barclays expanded its net lending by £1.2 billion (less than 
each of the previous three quarters of the FLS), the other three large banks 
further contracted their net lending: Lloyds by almost £1 billion, RBS by £1.6 
billion, and Santander by £2.3 billion. 
Of the Big 5 lenders, only Barclays and Nationwide increased net lending since 
the introduction of the FLS. 
In addition, the banking sector as a whole remains concerned about capital 
ratios. In March, the Bank of England decided to force the banks to raise another 
£25 billion of capital in the hope of rectifying this problem. We examine the 
possibility of splitting the nationalised banks into good and bad banks in order to 
properly clean up their balance sheets in more detail in Section 5.
Bankers and the central bank often suggest that a final problem has been a lack 
of demand for loans from the SME sector (partially because of lack of success 
in the past). Survey evidence suggests that the demand for new borrowing has 
been very weak with Bank of England Credit Conditions Survey, Q1, reporting 
a 28 per cent fall in demand for loans from small businesses, and around 8 per 
cent fall from medium businesses.81 However, such surveys tend not to cover 
the largest group of firms, namely micro-scale firms. The smaller the firm, the 
larger the problem of credit rationing tends to be, as scale is perceived to be 
linked to risk. The credit supplier finds it increasingly uneconomical, the smaller 
the size of the borrower – a ‘diseconomy of scale’ for the economy that is 
exacerbated by the increased concentration and size of the lenders in the UK.82
Source: Bank of England, table A8.1, code Z8Y8
Figure 11. Net lending to SMEs (excluding overdrafts) since introduction of FLS, £m, not seasonally adjusted. 
-1,200
-1,000
-800
-600
-400
-200
0
200
400
20
11
 M
ay
20
11
 J
un
e
20
11
 J
ul
y
20
11
 A
ug
20
11
 S
ep
t
20
11
 O
ct
20
11
 N
ov
20
11
 D
ec
20
12
 J
an
20
12
 F
eb
20
12
 M
ar
20
12
 A
pr
20
12
 M
ay
20
12
 J
un
e
20
12
 J
ul
y
20
12
 A
ug
20
12
 S
ep
t
20
12
 O
ct
20
12
 N
ov
20
12
 D
ec
20
13
 J
an
20
13
 F
eb
20
13
 M
ar
20
13
 A
pr
il
£ 
m
ill
io
ns
Strategic quantitative easing 24
Figure 12. Commercial bank FLS take-up and cumulative net lending, July-December 2012.
Source: Bank of England83
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4.3 Impact on government debt
There is fairly widespread agreement that QE has bought down the interest 
rates on government debt (gilts). Even if this did not stimulate purchases of 
corporate assets, it can still be seen to have had a beneficial macroeconomic 
effect for the UK in terms of reducing interest payments that might otherwise 
have been made to overseas investors in government debt. Calculations 
by Goodhart and Ashworth (Figure 13), suggest the potential savings to the 
Government that can be attributed to QE are around £55 billion in total, taking 
into account payments made by the Bank of England to commercial banks for 
holding reserves. The bulk of this is as a result of coupon payments received 
by the APF on the purchases of government debt made with central bank 
loans. Any doubt over whether this would be claimed by the Treasury and 
hence count towards reducing the UK deficit were dispelled In November 2012 
when George Osborne and Mervyn King decided to transfer the profits from 
the APF to the Treasury over time (of which more in Section 6).84
There is also a wider question as to whether gilt purchases by the APF 
should actually be counted as a reduction in public debt, since the Bank of 
England (and hence the APF) that now owns the gilts is itself owned by the 
Government. As some commentators have pointed out,85 the UK net public-
debt-to-GDP ratio would be reduced by about a third if the QE purchases were 
excluded – for March 2013, the reduction would be £1.186 trillion (64 per cent 
of GDP) to £811 billion (43 per cent of GDP).86 However, it is international 
convention to consider the central bank – which in most countries is legally 
independent from the Government concerning its policies – not to be included 
in the public sector.
Who holds government debt is also an important economic factor. As we 
can see from Figure 14, the post-crisis period saw a huge expansion in the 
issuance of government debt, mainly to cover the cost of bailing out the 
financial sector and the resulting recession. Between October 2008 and 
September 2012 the net issuance of gilts was £787 billion. Whilst around half of 
this debt was purchased by the APF, it is interesting to note that 26 per cent of 
FLS take-up Net lending
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it was bought by foreign investors. Although this foreign demand has no doubt 
been beneficial in helping to bring down the interest the Government pays on its 
borrowings, there are also downsides to having a large proportion of government 
debt held outside the UK. 
First, the interest payments on this debt are less likely to find their way back into 
the UK economy than if they were held by British investors. And secondly, the UK 
is more vulnerable to fickle international investor sentiment. If, for example, the 
UK suffers an economic shock of some kind, foreign gilt holders may be more 
likely to sell gilts as prices begin to fall than domestic holders. These latter – 
typically insurance companies and pension funds – are likely to be holding such 
assets to match long-term liabilities rather than for speculative reasons. They are 
thus likely to be reluctant to sell them even if their price falls. 
It is sometimes suggested that QE ‘subsidised the banking sector’. This may 
be true in the broad sense that it has supported financial market activity and 
provided both liquidity and cheaper funding to the banking sector, as well as 
contributed to rising asset prices. In the narrow sense of making capital gains on 
holdings of gilts, such gains exist but their size is limited, as banks held only 4 
per cent of the total stock of gilts prior to QE (Figure 14).
4.4 Distributional impacts of QE
QE has important distributional effects. It supports asset prices, including 
equities (shares) and house prices and thus helps people who hold such assets 
– mainly richer and older parts of the population. Keeping interest rates very low 
also hurts savers and makes pensions more expensive. And keeping inflation 
above real wages hurts workers. So QE should not be seen as a ‘neutral’ 
intervention by the Bank of England. 
The Bank of England, in testimony to the Treasury Select Committee, calculated 
that the value of shares and bonds had risen by 26 per cent – or £600 billion 
Figure 13. Total interest savings from QE to the Government. 
Source: Goodhart & Ashworth, 2012 87
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– as a result of QE, equivalent to £10 000 for each household in the UK.88 
However, the distribution of such assets among households is extremely 
uneven in the UK, with 80 per cent of financial investments (excluding 
pensions and property) concentrated in those over the age of 45 and 40 per 
cent in the wealthiest 5 per cent of the population. Estimates using wealth 
distribution data from the Office for National Statistics show the average 
boost to the holdings of financial assets and pensions of the richest 10 per 
cent of households would have been either £128 000 per household or £322 
000 depending on the methodology used.89 At a time when fiscal policy is 
disproportionately affecting the poorer sections of society as the Government 
cuts benefits and public services, this huge boost to the wealthiest segment of 
population via monetary policy raises serious concerns; we suggest it calls into 
question the validity of the distinction between ‘redistributive’ fiscal policy and 
‘neutral’ monetary policy.
QE has also been bad news for savers (Figure 16) as the rate on time deposits 
has fallen two percentage points since Bank Rate cuts and QE commenced. 
The inverse is that it has been better news for mortgage holders who will have 
seen their non-fixed payment rates falling.
In addition, whilst there are clearly considerable benefits to preventing deflation 
that QE helped achieve, it has (along with ultra low-interest rates) almost 
certainly contributed to keeping inflation above real wages, in particular since 
the second half of 2010 (Figure 16). As Professor Philip Haynes has pointed 
out, rising Consumer Price Inflation (the usual measure used by the authorities) 
has a disproportionate effect on the poor who spend a greater proportion of 
their income on consumer goods such as fuel and food.90 Research suggests 
that when prices rise faster than income, this increases total debt for poorer 
households.91 Such households do not enjoy the lower debt costs associated 
with QE because of being at high risk of default and having minimal assets as 
credit security.92 
Figure 14. UK Government bond holdings by sector. 
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4.4.1 Impact on pensions
The effect of QE on pensions is of greater significance than savings since 
pensions are more likely to be held in longer-term assets, such as gilts, or in 
longer-term corporate bonds that will be more affected by QE than by changes 
in short-term interest rates. Furthermore, the gilt yield is a key determinant in the 
calculation of future pension liabilities in the Defined Benefit schemes (final or 
career average salary schemes where the risk is borne by the employer), which 
constitute 60 per cent of UK pensions. Falling gilt yields increase the projected 
costs of meeting future pension payments and therefore require increased 
contributions by employers today. On the other hand, the boost in financial asset 
prices from QE will increase the present value of pension funds.
Figure 15. Inflation versus Real Wage growth, 2001–2012.
Figure 16. Change in household deposit rates and Bank Rate.
Source: ONS
Source: Bank of England93
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The Bank of England has argued that falls in government bond yields, which 
will negatively affect the value of pensions, may have been offset by the rise 
in corporate yields.94 However, for pension schemes whose liabilities (future 
payments to employees) are already greater than their assets, QE will lead to 
a proportionately greater increase in this deficit. In analysing the impact of the 
first round of QE1, the Pension Corporation (2011) estimated that it increased 
pension fund deficits in the UK by around £74 billion (after netting off equity 
gains)— equivalent to £7.4 billion additional annual contributions by employers 
over a 10-year period.95 Since QE began, there has been a sharp deterioration 
in the liabilities of pension funds that were already in deficit, bringing down the 
aggregate surplus/deficit significantly. 96
This worsening deficit position may be one of a number of factors behind UK 
companies’ reluctance to invest more of their estimated £750 billion97 cash pile 
on expanding production – a perverse outcome for QE which is a policy aimed 
at boosting nominal demand and GDP growth. 
4.5 Risks posed by QE
QE, as currently practised by the UK and other countries, carries with it a range 
of risks and unintended consequences. Most obviously, there is a danger that 
QE artificially inflates the value of certain assets, in particular equities and 
commodities. Deprived of government debt, investors’ search for yield may 
become increasingly detached from market fundamentals. The huge rise in 
equity prices since 2009 (Figure 7) needs some explanation given the global 
economy has been in a slump, unemployment is rising and many developed 
economies have been cutting back on government expenditure. The combined 
effects of large-scale asset purchases by western central banks – $7 trillion in 
total up to now – appear to provide it.98,99
International financial institutions, including the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Bank of International Settlements have 
expressed concern about this phenomenon in recent times.100,101 In a recent 
report, the IMF warned of signs of a ‘mispricing of credit risk’, a euphemism 
for asset bubbles.102 It also estimated that losses from soaring bond yields – 
and therefore falling values – could reach 6 per cent for the Bank of England 
(although this, of course, assumes that the Bank of England will eventually 
sell the bonds back in to the market). Both the IMF and the World Bank have 
also pointed to the potentially destabilising effect on developing countries as 
investors flood currency and commodity markets with QE funds. The IMF stated 
in the same report that: 
More generally, effects on Emerging Market Economies can be 
destabilizing if amplified by market imperfections and relatively shallow 
markets. The limited ability to absorb capital and the tendency to trade 
on short-term trends can cause excessive currency appreciation and 
volatility, unsustainable credit expansion, and asset price bubbles 
(including in commodities, especially those held as assets, like oil). 
These could eventually undermine financial stability.
There was a large financial outflow from the UK following the first round of 
QE103,104 alongside major inflows in developing countries – in particular East 
Asia and the Americas – suggesting investors were using the funds to buy up 
assets in these countries. The recent announcement of the potential unwinding 
of QE in the U.S. has caused considerable volatility in stock markets and in 
emerging market economies.
4.6 Empirical evidence on drivers of GDP
As mentioned earlier, a flaw with many of the empirical studies of QE is that 
they focus on intermediate variables – typically financial market prices or 
yields – rather than on the ultimate goal of QE, nominal demand, or GDP 
growth (nominal means not adjusted for inflation). Another problem is that the 
time period for analysis is so short and the economic and financial dynamics 
so extraordinary that counterfactual analysis and attribution become major 
problems.
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Our empirical quantitative research on the effects of QE, which develops earlier 
work by co-author Richard Werner,105,106,107 attempts to overcome these 
problems in two ways. First, we examine the impact of a wide range of different 
monetary policy variables, including QE-related variables, directly on nominal 
GDP growth, the ultimate goal of QE. These are laid out in Table 1, along with 
their hypothesised effects. Secondly, we use a long quarterly time series, 
stretching back to the first quarter of 1990 and up to the last quarter of 2012, a 
total of 92 observations. 
To further capture the historical dynamics of the period under question, we also 
regressed four ‘lags’ of each variable (i.e. the result in the corresponding quarter 
of the year before) and also included lags of the dependent variable (nominal 
GDP growth). This provides us with a total of 34 different independent variables. 
We also include a ‘dummy’ variable to adjust for the effect of the financial crisis. 
A full explanation of the methodology along with a range of statistical tests and 
data sources is provided in the Technical Appendix.108
Table 1. Variables and their hypothesised effects.
Variable
Variable name  
(Quarterly Year-
on-Year change) Hypothesised effect
Bank Rate (the bank of 
England interest rate charged 
to banks for holding reserves)
Bankrate Standard monetary policy 
impact – reduce interest rate 
leads to increased growth
Quantity of reserves in the 
banking system
Reserves More reserves in the banking 
system reduces liquidity and 
funding costs and leads to more 
bank lending and increased 
growth
Bank of England total assets BoETA ‘Portfolio rebalancing effect’ – 
as the bank takes more safe 
assets on to its balance sheet 
and pushes up prices, it should 
stimulate investors to switch 
to corporate assets (bonds or 
equities), leading to increased 
business investment
Qualitative easing – the 
ratio of long-term assets 
(government bonds) to Total 
Assets held on the Bank of 
England’s balance sheet
QualEasing ‘Portfolio re-balancing effect’ 
– by pushing down medium 
and long term interest rates on 
government bonds, investors 
should again be incentivized to 
buy corporate assets.
Broad money – the broadest 
deposit aggregate 
M4 Increase in broad money will 
have portfolio re-balancing 
effects as investors switch out 
of deposits and in to higher 
yielding corporate assets. 
Bank credit to the real 
economy (excluding the 
effects of securitization)
M4LREx Credit creation by banks for 
GDP transactions should directly 
create growth
 
Our ‘general-to-specific’ methodology involves sequentially reducing the least 
significant of the independent variables in the general model down until we are 
left with a parsimonious109 specific model, as shown in Figure 17 (the General 
model is in the Appendix). Our results suggest changes in bank credit creation 
to the real economy (with a one-year time lag – M4LREx_1) are the most 
important predictor of GDP growth, taking into account the relative impact of all 
variables on GDP and their lags. 
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Table 2. Parsimonious model of Ordinary Least Squared general-to-specific 
model of QE variables regressed on to Quarterly Year-on-Year GDP growth, 
1990 Q1: 2012:Q4 (92 observations).
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.0200038 0.00281726 7.1004 <0.00001 ***
YoYM4LREx_1 0.0918259 0.025919 3.5428 0.00064 ***
Crisis Dummy -0.0363168 0.00544343 -6.6717 <0.00001 ***
YoYGDP_1 0.453059 0.0891117 5.0842 <0.00001 ***
YoYGDP_2 0.335024 0.0941462 3.5585 0.00061 ***
YoYGDP_4 -0.291836 0.0686314 -4.2522 0.00005 ***
Mean dependent var  0.047987 S.D. dependent var  0.023799
Sum squared resid  0.008481 S.E. of regression  0.009931
R-squared  0.835448 Adjusted R-squared  0.825881
F(5, 86)  87.32633 P-value(F)  3.40e-32
Log-likelihood  296.8744 Akaike criterion -581.7489
Schwarz criterion -566.6182 Hannan-Quinn -575.6420
rho -0.003576 Durbin's h -0.064769
Changes in interest rates and increases to ‘broad money’ (increased deposits in 
the hands of investors and banks) do not appear to have had any significant effect 
on nominal GDP growth even in non-recessionary periods (e.g. 1993 to 2008) – 
both variables drop out of the specific model. Likewise the proposed ‘portfolio re-
balancing’ instruments, ‘QualitativeEasing’ and changes to total Bank of England 
assets. The lags of GDP (e.g. YoYGDP_2) remain in the parsimonious model, but this 
is quite a standard result for quarterly time series data. 
As shown in Figure 17, the results support the Quantity Theory of Credit110 which 
postulates that nominal GDP growth is a function of credit creation for GDP 
transactions. It is found that the relationship between credit creation for the real 
economy and nominal GDP is close for the whole 12-year period under analysis, 
with the exception of the crisis period itself where credit creation appears to lag GDP 
growth. We believe this may be due to the impact of automatic stabilisers111 coming 
into effect as the recession emerged and also the international effects described 
earlier, in particular the action of the Federal Reserve. The UK banking system, 
meanwhile, took much longer to recover for reasons already described in detail. 
Figure 17. Bank lending to the real economy versus growth rate of nominal GDP. 1990, Q1 to 2012, 
Q1 (Quarterly, not seasonally adjusted).
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4.7 Summary
For a range of reasons, QE has appeared to have a limited impact on bank 
lending, which our empirical analysis suggests is a key driver of nominal GDP. 
The portfolio rebalancing effect hasn’t appeared to be very strong either. 
Investors, companies and (richer) households seem to prefer holding on to the 
extra liquidity or wealth that QE has provided them with rather than invest their 
money in GDP-related transactions. The reasons for this are no doubt manifold 
but surveys suggest a major barrier to investment is a simple lack of confidence 
in the economy and future demand for goods and services.112 This lack of 
confidence rose significantly in 2008 and has remained high relative to historical 
levels at around 60 per cent of respondents. Inability to raise external finance 
is also cited by over 10 per cent of respondents which is also high by historical 
standards. 
Meanwhile, the banking system remains equally stymied. Despite the more 
direct intervention of the FLS, key parts of the sector are deleveraging and 
reducing their balance sheets at just the time the Government needs them 
to be doing the opposite. Once they have built up their capital to the levels 
required by the Bank of England, no doubt they will start to become more willing 
to lend again. But UK banks had been failing to invest in SMEs and other parts 
of the productive economy for decades even before the financial crisis.113 We 
conclude that more urgent and direct action is warranted to re-boot and re-
balance the UK economy, and the next section sets out proposals for how this 
can be achieved.
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5. Strategic QE: kick-starting the real economy 
It was estimated at the time that one out of ten commercial aircraft 
in Canada was pledged to the Industrial Development Bank and 
that a person could probably travel from one end of the country to 
the other on aircraft mortgaged to the Bank, being handed on from 
one borrowing company to the next. 
E. Ritchie Clark114
It is clear … that what a great nation can ‘afford’ in periods of crisis 
depends not on its money but on its man power and its goods. 
Russia, Italy, Germany, Japan, the United States, all used money 
in the situations mentioned, but money was obviously not the 
dominant factor. Man power and materials were the dominant 
factor. Yet at other times, when crisis was not so acute, the money 
for necessary tasks could not be found. Unemployment, insecurity, 
want, dragged on. This is a puzzling paradox. At certain times a 
nation can afford what at other times, with no less money, it cannot 
afford. At certain times we are afraid of national bankruptcy, and at 
other times we give it hardly a thought.
Stuart Chase, 1943, Economist, engineer 
and adviser to Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson.115 
So there clearly is spare capacity. But I think it’s also the case that if 
demand were to pick up quickly then there would be a period over 
which demand could grow at much faster rates than at present and 
would bring forth the supply that would meet that demand.
Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England116
Our econometric modelling shows that the most important macroeconomic 
variable driving GDP growth is likely to be credit creation by banks for the real 
economy. QE and the Bank of England’s other polices have failed to sufficiently 
stimulate this kind of lending. The Government needs a different kind of 
‘monetary activism’.117
We assess two options for more targeted use of QE funding: first a massive 
purchase of illiquid assets from those banks which are most in need of a 
balance sheet clean-up;118,119 secondly, getting new money into the real 
economy directly via the purchase of bonds in institutions – such as public 
development banks or housing associations – with a remit to invest directly in 
the real economy.
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There is a strong case that both these options would be likely to enhance the positive 
impact of QE on the real economy. The channels by which this is achieved, set out 
in Figure 18, are much simpler than the reliance of existing asset purchases on the 
portfolio rebalancing, wealth, and bank lending channels described in Section 4.
5.1 Purchasing non-performing assets from UK banks
In this final press conference, the out-going Governor of the Bank of England, 
Mervyn King, was asked about his actions during the crisis, and specifically whether 
the banks’ bad debts had been sufficiently recognised and dealt with. His answer 
was unequivocal: the Bank of England made it clear at the time (although not 
publicly) that a more radical recapitalisation was necessary.120 King’s answer is 
revealing. With the benefit of hindsight, he clearly believes the Government and the 
Bank of England should have done more to clean up the commercial banks’ balance 
sheets. How might the new Governor, Mark Carney, make good on King’s regret?
The most obvious way of doing this would be for the Bank of England to re-start the 
purchase of non-government assets, in particular non-performing assets or loans 
which banks lack confidence will be repaid at market rates. The SLS and FLS can 
both be seen as interventions that addressed this problem to an extent in that they 
enable banks to temporarily swap illiquid assets for Treasury Bills that can be used 
access reserves. Ultimately though, such schemes do not address the banks’ need 
to enhance their capital adequacy ratios since the risk remains on the commercial 
banks’ balance sheets. These risks are considerable, as set out in a statement by 
the FPC which identified the following additional capital requirements for UK banks 
arising over the next three years:121
P	 Additional losses of around £30 billion on specific high-risk loan portfolios, 
including exposures to UK commercial real estate and vulnerable euro-area 
economies. 
P	 Additional costs of around £10 billion in relation to claims for mis-selling. 
P	 Additional capital requirement of roughly £12 billion from applying a more 
prudent approach to risk weights in the banking book (raising risk-weighted 
assets by some £170 billion, equivalent to roughly £12 billion of capital at a 7 per 
cent equity capital ratio)
Taken together, the effect of these three adjustments would be equivalent to around 
a £50 billion reduction in the regulatory capital of the major UK banks and building 
societies. The FPC also stated that further increases in capital will be required to 
meet full Basel III compliance, the surcharge on systemically important banks, the 
new trading book capital regime, and the UK Government’s implementation of the 
Independent Commission on Banking (ICB) recommendations.
Figure 18. Strategic QE channels to stimulating the economy.
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To address the coming capital crunch in the UK banking sector, the APF could 
purchase illiquid assets from the banking sector as was done between March and 
December 2009 (see Section 2.3.4) and has been done to a much larger extent by the 
Japanese, US, and European Central banks.122,123,124,125 King has expressed concern 
that such action risks the Bank of England incurring losses for taxpayers, and as such 
is a decision for the Chancellor, not for the Monetary Policy Committee.126
There are two responses to this. First, any assets bought by the APF are indemnified 
by the Treasury and so ultimately owned by the taxpayer rather than the Bank of 
England. Secondly, RBS (and to a lesser extent Lloyds) are now effectively nationalised 
banks and so the taxpayer is already at risk in the case of these two banks. There have 
been widespread calls for RBS to be recapitalised and broken up to create greater 
competition in the banking sector, including by the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, 
two members of the Parliamentary Committee on Banking Standards and by nef.127 
The APF could play the role of the ‘bad bank’, holding the illiquid assets on its balance 
sheet and freeing up the ‘good bank’ to focus on retail lending.
5.1.1. Credit-easing: How QE worked more effectively in the USA
The Federal Reserve began large-scale purchases of longer-term securities in 
November/December 2008. It concentrated on purchases of agency mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) rather than government debt (the term ‘agency’ is used 
because the securities were held by government-owned mortgage enterprises, Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac). In March 2009, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) 
announced a major increase in the scale of purchases – raising ceilings on purchases 
of agency MBS and agency debt to $1.25 trillion and $200 billion, respectively (shown 
in orange in Figure 19).128 
Figure 19. Federal Reserve and Bank of England assets compared. 
Source: Charles Schwab; Bank of England129
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We can see from Figure 19 that whilst the size of asset purchases was not 
dissimilar in total, close to half of the Fed’s purchases was made up of these 
MBS securities (orange colour). The US Central bank has effectively taken 
$1.5 trillion of illiquid and underperforming financial sector assets on to its own 
balance sheet, massively improving the balance sheets of all those US banks 
exposed to the credit crisis. And as part of its QE3 programme, the Fed has 
announced the initiation of further purchases of MBS at a rate of $40 billion every 
month, amounting to close to half of its total stimulus of $85 billion per month. 
In contrast, the Bank of England offered short-term relief to banks through its SLS 
and now FLS but the quantities and time period were much smaller. The Fed’s 
equivalent of QE – the purchase of longer-term Treasury securities – began later 
(shown in blue in Figure 20) and involved maintaining the existing dollar stock of 
purchased securities on its balance sheet by reinvesting proceeds from agency-
related securities investments in longer-term Treasuries. 
Theoretical modelling suggests that purchases of securities with some private 
risk (i.e. asset-backed securities) have stronger effects than purchases of 
government bonds – i.e. the USA’s ‘credit-easing’ approach should give a 
significantly stronger boost to US GDP than the UK Quantitative Easing policy.130 
And it is certainly the case that US lending to the real economy, in stark contrast 
to the UK, has recovered to pre-crisis levels (Figure 20). 
There may also a stronger demand-side impact from the purchase of MBS. 
One of the Governors of the Fed, Jeremy Stein, has stated that he believes the 
purchase of MBS has greater impact on GDP ‘dollar-for-dollar’ than the purchase 
of bonds because of its effect on lowering household mortgage rates and thus 
raising household disposable income and spending.131 
Japan also engaged in large-scale asset purchases from the banking system in 
an earlier, much larger banking crisis (1945). Despite its much larger scale and 
the much larger dependence of the corporate sector on borrowing from banks 
(100 per cent in the early post-war years, as capital markets remained basically 
Figure 20. US bank lending to businesses. (commercial and industrial loans, seasonally adjusted, 
annual growth rate, break adjusted). 
Source: Federal Reserve Board 2013 
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closed), this crisis did not result in noticeable reductions in economic growth or 
economic activity. Bank credit growth recovered significantly within a year and 
Japan’s economy could tackle the vast challenges of rebuilding a bombed-out 
economy.132 Why the Bank of Japan chose not to adopt this highly successful 
policy in the 1990s is subject to some debate.133 
Nevertheless, the Bank of England was probably the pioneer of such measures of 
purchasing non-performing assets from the banks in order to support the economy. 
This happened in August 1914 and shortly thereafter. It had been found that the 
declaration of war on Germany and its allies by the UK at that time had rendered 
many major UK financial institutions bankrupt, since international bills of exchange, 
bills of trade, and other financial instruments issued by these enemy nations 
had to be considered unenforceable and hence in default. However, London 
had been the world’s financial centre where such international instruments had 
been traded and thus were held to a significant extent by UK financial institutions. 
Since the outbreak of the Great War was not considered to be an ideal time for a 
banking crisis, the Treasury and the Bank of England took the most efficient step to 
solve the non-performing asset problem in the banking system: the central bank 
purchased these instruments, at prices far exceeding any perceived market value 
(it was indemnified by the Treasury, but these indemnities were not needed and 
never used). The operation was successful without direct costs to taxpayers.134 
5.2 Direct lending for real economy investment
There has been a range of proposals for how QE could be targeted to more directly 
meet the needs of the UK economy and create growth.135 Such interventions could 
do more than just meet the short-term need for GDP growth. As can be seen in 
Figure 21, UK banks prefer making loans that are secured against existing property 
or to other financial institutions rather than making loans that support productive 
activity. This was the case for many years prior to the crisis. Figure 23 does not 
appear to represent an efficient market allocation of capital unless we believe that 
favouring asset bubbles over productive investment is efficient. 
Figure 21. Net bank lending by sector 1997–2012.
 Source: Bank of England136
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The lack of productive lending by banks has been exacerbated by a fall in 
government capital investment as a percentage of GDP since the crisis (Figure 22). 
This is now significantly lower than our major competitors (Figure 23). Although 
the government has bought forward some capital spending, since 2010, public 
investment has fallen from £50 billion (3 per cent of GDP) to £28 billion (1.5 per cent), 
and is forecast to drop to £25 billion next year and £22 billion the year after.137 That 
the UK needs large-scale infrastructure investment in transport, energy, and housing 
is widely accepted and has been laid out in detail elsewhere.138,139 How to fund such 
investment with patient, low-cost capital remains a more difficult problem, however.
Source: World Bank
 Figure 22. UK Gross Fixed Capital Formation 2000/2011. 
Figure 23. Gross Fixed Capital Formation as a % of GDP in selection of G20 countries. 
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We propose that the APF could purchase bonds in intermediaries that specialise 
in providing funding to particular sectors of the economy that are recognised 
as having spare capacity. The existence of spare capacity and/or unfulfilled 
demand provides prima facie evidence of market failure, which should ensure 
compliance with EU state aid regulations (although this is a complex area where 
further research, including expert legal opinion, is required to define the precise 
structures and terms and conditions required to ensure compliance).
The advantages of this proposal are as follows:
P	 Investment via purchase of newly issued bonds is a small evolution from 
current practice. Indeed, as the original mandate of the APF was to purchase 
corporate bonds, it may be seen as more in keeping with the intended 
purpose of the Treasury in authorising the creation of the APF than the 
purchase of government bonds.
P	 Purchase of newly issued bonds, rather than existing bonds in the secondary 
market, provides a direct injection of capital into the economy instead of relying 
on financial investors to reallocate capital through the portfolio rebalancing 
effect.
P	 The use of intermediaries ensures an appropriate division of responsibilities 
between investment professionals that have the expertise to assess and select 
individual companies and projects, and economists at the Bank of England 
who have the expertise to identify economic sectors that require capital 
investment. We examine governance issues in more detail in Section 6.2.
P	 The provision of patient capital to intermediaries is likely to provide 
opportunities to ‘crowd-in’ private finance by giving confidence to private sector 
investors.
P	 The terms of finance can either be at market rates or preferential rates. Market 
rates would allow for sale of bonds by the APF into the secondary markets at 
a later date, preserving maximum flexibility around monetary policy and also 
developing the breadth and depth of UK bond markets. Alternatively, low-cost 
finance via bonds with very low coupon rates held by the APF until maturity 
would expand the range of feasible projects to include economically beneficial 
investment that cannot be provided by the private sector because of extensive 
social or environmental externalities. This precedent has been set already by 
FLS and Help to Buy, both of which provide funding and guarantees at non-
commercial rates to commercial banks. FLS funding can be accessed for as 
little as 0.25 per cent per annum.140
One of the key obstacles to injecting funds into the real economy under strategic 
QE (or indeed tax-funded government investment programmes) is finding the 
means of deploying investment rapidly and efficiently. We examine a range 
of options which either exist already, or could be utilised with relatively little 
institutional and regulatory change:
1. National development banks, building on the British Business Bank (BBB) and 
the Green Investment Bank (GIB).
2. Housing construction, via a new intermediary to fund construction of new 
homes for social and affordable rent.
3. Housing retrofit, via the Green Deal Finance Company.
We do not consider this to be an exhaustive list and certainly should not preclude 
other options. They are intended to illustrate that strategic QE is possible in 
practice. 
5.2.1 Capitalising national development banks
We suggest that the APF could fund the GIB and the BBB.141 The current and 
planned capital base for these institutions – £4 billion of new capital is being 
invested – suggest they will not be of a size or scale to make a material difference 
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to productive investment that the UK economy needs. Comparisons with the UK’s 
key international competitors are not favourable (Figure 24). These institutions 
should get banking licenses, in order to be able to lend beyond their capital – 
currently they are better described as ‘funds’ that leverage existing private sector 
capital.142 However, even in their current form, the GIB and the BBB could issue 
long-term, investment-grade bonds that would be bought by the APF. 
There are precedents for central banks supporting the SME sector, including 
the Canadian Industrial Development Bank (the IDB) which, from its inception in 
1944 until 1975, was entirely funded with central bank money creation and cost 
the taxpayer nothing (Box 3). National and pan-national investment banks today 
include the Nordige Bank, the European Investment Bank (EIB), the Council of 
Europe Development Bank, the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e 
Social (BNDES) in Brazil, the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) in Germany, the 
Japanese Finance Corporation, and the Chinese Development Bank, all of which 
are considerably larger in scale than the current UK equivalents. These organisations 
have been highlighted as key to strategic investment and innovation in these 
countries, in particular by de-risking long-term capital projects that the private sector 
would otherwise be reluctant to support.143,144
The GIB has already demonstrated the potential of ‘crowding in’ private sector 
investment, attracting in £1.67 billion worth of private capital for projects it funded 
to the tune of £635 million. But these figures pale in comparison with the German 
KfW which has assets of half a trillion euro, making it roughly twice the size of the 
World Bank (Figure 26). It lent €70 billion in 2011, with about a third going to energy 
and climate change investments, including €24 billion from 2009 to 2011 on energy 
efficiency in homes, which leveraged a total investment of €58 billion.145 
The need for public investment banks to support vital infrastructure and 
SME lending that would otherwise not be undertaken by the private sector is 
demonstrated by the mandates given to such banks in other countries (Box 4).
Source: World Bank and respective institutions
Figure 24. Assets of selected public investment banks as a % of 
GDP (2011).
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Box 3: The Canadian Industrial Development Bank.
The Canadian government established the Industrial Development Bank (IDB), as a subsidiary of the Canadian 
Central Bank, with a specific remit to support the SME sector in 1944. The IDB was one of the first ever development 
banks and became one of the largest and most successful.146 The important role of the central bank and monetary 
policy is made clear in the preamble to the Act which saw the IDB come in force, with the purpose of the bank:
to promote the economic welfare of Canada by increasing the effectiveness of monetary action through 
ensuring the availability of credit to industrial enterprises which may reasonably be expected to prove 
successful if a high level of national income and employment is maintained, by supplementing the activities 
of other lenders and by providing capital assistance to industry with particular consideration to the financing 
problems of smaller enterprises.147
As with UK banks today, the Canadian chartered banks showed little interest in the kind of medium- or long-term 
loans that Canadian businesses needed to rebuild their economy. The IDB was set up to plug this financing gap 
and any business that requested funds would have to demonstrate that it could not attain them at reasonable rates 
from a commercial bank first.
There were concerns in the Canadian parliament that the IDB would create a conflict of interest for the central bank 
which was also charged with regulating the country’s economy. However, the then Deputy Minister of Finance did 
not see this as a concern, arguing that the link between the two banks would be beneficial to the central bank. It 
would have ‘more intimate contact… with the conditions and the problems of small and medium sized industries’. 
Further, ‘the operations of the IDB will naturally have to dovetail into the country’s monetary policy’, and a corporate 
link between the two banks would make this easier.148
Despite gloomy forecasts that IDB would help only bankrupts and ‘lame duck’ businesses, in its 31 years the IDB 
authorised 65 000 loans totalling $3 billion for 48 000 businesses that were considered by the Bank (as required by 
the IDB Act) to be unable to obtain the financing elsewhere on reasonable terms and conditions. Well over 90 per 
cent were successful in establishing themselves and retiring their IDB loans. It was estimated that they employed 
close to 900 000 people. Most of the Bank’s borrowers were small; the average loan was $47 000 and 48 per cent 
of the loans authorised were for $25 000 or less.149
In his history of the IDB, former employee E. Ritchie Clark records that:
The Bank assisted in just about every kind of business and program imaginable, from setting up a new pipe 
mill or refinery to helping a young lawyer acquire his own law library. It was active in every part of Canada, 
and in some remote areas such as the Yukon was a major factor in economic growth. The IDB was probably 
the most important source of financial support from commercial air services apart from the mainline 
operations, for motels and other kind of tourist services, and for many kinds of manufacturing such as small 
and medium sized lumber operations and the production of hosiery.150 
The IDB was entirely funded via the creation of reserves by the Bank of Canada which bought all of its bonds in its 
31 years, with not a single penny from the tax payer. 
The IDB was initially funded by the purchase of $25 million equity stock by the Bank of Canada. By starting off with 
only equity money and no borrowed funds, the new Bank was to have a favourable start and develop some strength 
and attractiveness in its operating record before it should have to borrow and pay interest. By end of 1947, all $25 
million of stock had been taken down leaving IDB with significant surplus funds. These were invested in government 
securities. By 1951, virtually all equity funds had been used up in the IDB’s loans, and it was starting to look into 
ways of borrowing. 
The IDB charged a 5 per cent flat rate of interest on all of its loans, no matter what the size or sector of business, 
which was 2 per cent above the average commercial rate of the time. It earned considerable interest on surplus 
cash from interest – $600 000 as compared to income from loans totalling $550 000 – which was important in 
enabling IDB to meet its operating expenses in the early years.151 
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5.2.2 Buying housing association bonds for new home construction
Alternatively, or in addition, APF funds could be used to support the construction 
of new low-cost housing, a call already made by a number of organisations and 
experts in the housing area.152,153,154
Construction has long been recognised as an important source of growth in 
the UK economy. While it only contributes around 7 per cent to GDP directly, 
when the entire construction value chain is included the figure goes to 13 per 
cent, with around three million people employed in 2010.155 Estimates put the 
construction ‘multiplier’ at around £1:2.84, much higher than most sectors.156 
Construction work is especially good for generating local jobs and local 
economic activity, with over 90p in every £1 of construction spending retained 
locally and 93 per cent of the supply chain sourced domestically. As the vast 
majority of the 263 000 firms are classed as SMEs, the sector can also harness 
this growth potential.157 In addition, the sector places little reliance on imports, 
with 93 per cent of intermediate consumption (its supply chain) being  
accounted for by UK-based suppliers and considerable export potential.158 
Construction jobs are also estimated to be around 75 per cent more labour 
intensive than service sector jobs and well suited to apprenticeships and youth 
training schemes.159
Yet in 2012 alone, 89 000 jobs were lost in the construction sector160 and, after 
a brief resurgence in 2010, the sector has contracted in all but two of the last 10 
quarters (Figure 25). 
Whilst the fall-off in demand for some kinds of construction, in particular out-
of-town shopping centres and business parks, is likely part of an inevitable 
readjustment to long-term trends following the credit bubble of 2000–2007, 
there remains enormous pent-up demand for new housing. As shown in Figure 
26, home completions remain at historic lows. House-building was particularly 
vulnerable to the financial crisis because the vast majority of new homes are 
now built by the private sector which is itself dependent on bank credit, both 
directly and via the mortgage market. When mortgage lending collapsed in 
2008, so did home building. It has yet to recover. 
Box 4: Mandates of a selection of national and supranational state 
investment banks.
Institution Mandate or mission statement
KfW (Germany) To sustainably improve the economic, social, and ecological condition of peoples’ 
lives.
Small Business Administration (USA) To aid, counsel, assist, and protect the interests of small business concerns, to 
preserve free competitive enterprise and to maintain and strengthen the overall 
economy of our nation.
BNDEs (Brazil) To contribute to the economic development of Brazil, including sustainable socio-
economic development, technological innovation and the modernisation of public 
administration.
Council of Europe Development Bank Strengthening social cohesion in Europe.
• Strengthen social integration
• Manage the environment
• Support public infrastructure with a social vocation
Nordic Investment Bank To promote sustainable growth by providing complementary financing based on 
sound banking principles which strengthen competitiveness and enhance the 
environment.
European Investment Bank To support projects which make a significant contribution to growth, employment, 
economics and social cohesion and environmental sustainability in Europe and 
beyond.
Strategic quantitative easing 42
But even if private sector house building was to recover, the great need in the UK is 
for more affordable housing, rather than housing per se. Historically, local authorities 
created social and affordable housing and more recently housing associations have 
been contributing but the volume remains small. The UK has spent almost £2 billion 
housing homeless families in short-term temporary accommodation, according to a 
recent study.161
We would argue that the APF should consider purchasing bonds for new house-
building that could be issued by housing associations, local authority housing 
companies, or perhaps via a Public Interest Company (PIC) with a remit to build 
homes that it will sell on to private or social sectors in the future.
A Housing Investment Bank or public interest company
A financial intermediary would be required in order to fairly allocate APF funds 
across the UK. One option would be the creation of a third publically owned 
investment bank, a National Housing Bank. Alternatively, a PIC could be set up with 
a remit to build homes that it will sell on to private or social sectors in the future, 
as suggested by construction expert Brian Green.162 A housing bank or PIC could 
choose either to buy the bonds at market rates, ensuring they would tradable in 
the secondary market, or at a subsidised rate in order to enable more homes to 
be provided at social and affordable rents, perhaps as low as the 0.25 per cent 
currently offered by the Treasury and the Bank of England in the FLS.163 
Both the CBI and trade unions have called on the Government to boost capital 
spending on housing and construction. In an independent inquiry into affordable 
housing published last summer by a group of housing agencies, NGOs and trade 
unions, a call for £5–10 billion QE investment in housing was made and it was 
estimated this would deliver around 60 000 new homes and enable developments 
that are currently stalled to proceed. In the same report, The National Housing 
Federation argues that investment to deliver just 10 000 homes would deliver  
75,000 jobs and make a contribution of £4 billion to the wider economy. It would 
also save £290 million from the social security bill by reducing housing benefit and 
Jobseeker’s Allowance claims.164 
Figure 25. Construction – quarterly % change, 2009–2013. 
Source: ONS
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Green argues that the Bank of England should buy £50 billion worth of bonds in a 
time-limited PIC with a remit to build homes that it will sell on to the private or social 
sectors in future. He estimates that it would bring in £10 billion to the Treasury from 
the jobs created, based upon the estimate that every unemployed construction 
worker put back to work nets the Treasury £25–£30 000 in benefits saved and taxes 
generated. The Home Builders Federation estimates that every home built creates 
1.5 jobs directly and twice that number in the supply chain, so £10 billion (£20 000 
x 500 000 homes) is a fairly conservative estimate. Rents could cover payment of 
interest in the short term and future surpluses on sale proceeds could go back to 
the Government.165
If the Treasury is looking for a precedent for the potential economic impact of house 
construction, it should look back to the 1930s when a huge house-building boom 
played a vital role in pulling the UK out of the Great Depression at a faster rate than 
many other countries. In 1930 there were about 800 000 workers in the UK building 
industry, but by 1939 this number had risen to over a million. The number of new 
dwellings built each year averaged over 300 000 during this period – far higher than 
the average of just 184 000 between 2000 and 2010. 
Whilst the funding for this expansion in the 1930s was through borrowing, the  
New Zealand government achieved a similar expansion in house building by 
utilising direct credit creation by its central bank – The Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand (Box 5).
Issuing house-building bonds
Increasing difficulty in obtaining reasonably priced loan finance for housing has 
led to the growth of bond finance, either directly, as in the case of large housing 
associations, or by participation in aggregated bonds as in the case of smaller 
associations.169, 170
Source: DCLG
Figure 26. Housing completions by tenure, 1949–2012. 
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However, transaction costs, in time and money, remain high in this emerging market 
and there is also the requirement for a strong credit rating. Even if all of these 
hurdles are overcome, market conditions and investor confidence are fragile in 
current economic conditions. Therefore, we argue that the proposal for the APF to 
purchase housing bonds is building on current trends and would help to stimulate 
a major new investment asset class. Over the medium to longer term, this may help 
to ‘crowd-in’ private finance which would help to counter problems with EU state aid 
regulation. 
In fact, the construction of social housing has always been subsidised, and remains 
so even if the Government has moved away from direct capital subsidy towards 
offering state-backed guarantees to investors in English housing associations. If the 
taxpayer is already on the hook by the offer of loan guarantees, then surely there 
can be no objection in principle to finance from the APF, which is also guaranteed 
by the Treasury? 
Irrespective of the subsidy argument, however, it is hard to think of an asset less 
risky in terms of future returns than a new home, especially in the UK. A home is a 
highly tradable asset and in the long run retains its value, with new homes normally 
gaining added value as the communities they create mature.172 It is for this reason 
that it is estimated that to rebuild the UK’s housing stock would cost less than half 
the asset value.
We would not argue that QE funding for house-building alone would solve the many 
issues with the UK housing market, some of which are set out briefly in Box 6.
Box 5. Central Bank public works investment in New Zealand, 1935–1939.
In 1934, New Zealand (still a British colony at the time) established its own (partially privately owned) central bank, 
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ), with the blessing of the Bank of England. The main objective of the 
Conservative government of the time was to stabilise the national currency and help reflate the economy following the 
Great Depression. The New Zealand pound was pegged to sterling and subject to major fluctuations in international 
commodity prices, with New Zealand highly dependent on Britain and Australia for both imports and exports. Following 
a devaluation of the NZ£, the central bank began to hold foreign reserves and smooth out these fluctuations.
In 1935, the incoming Labour government made a number of changes to the form of functioning of the RBNZ in its 
1936 Reserve Bank Amendment Act. The Act nationalised the organisation completely, with the state buying out the 
Bank’s private shareholders, provided more scope for the Bank to extend credit to the government and its agencies, 
and also added a power that allowed the Reserve Bank to vary the reserve requirements on trading banks.166 
The incoming finance minister, John Nash, was determined to use the RBNZ as a tool to support the massive 
fiscal expansion the Labour party thought necessary to shift the economy out of recession and tackle the massive 
unemployment problem. This broad remit, going well beyond price stability, saw the Reserve Bank being used to 
support government spending in the form of credit creation for the real economy. The two most notable uses of this 
policy were RBNZ being used to guarantee farm prices, with shortfalls between market and guaranteed prices met by 
its advances, and credit for housing finance. 
Nash ordered the Reserve Bank to make advances available as a deliberate test of the effect of ‘a limited amount of 
credit expansion’ for the building of state housing. The sum involved was significant at £5 million. The new homes built 
were mainly for poorer households and targeted New Zealand’s most serious slums. Aside from housing, the Reserve 
Bank supported a range of other infrastructure and public works activities and supported farmers by guaranteeing 
their exports. In total, in the period from 1936 to 1939, the RBNZ created NZ£30 million of credit to support the 
government. In the latter two years this was 5 per cent and 7 per cent of GDP and 13 per cent and 17 per cent of 
commercial bank assets.
According to detailed econometric analysis by Greasley and Oxley, the RBNZ’s expansionary credit policy was a key 
feature in reflating the domestic economy and enabling the country to grow more rapidly out of the 1930s depression 
than many other countries. Over the four year period from when the Bank commenced its credit creation policies, real 
GDP increased by 30 per cent,167 with 15 per cent growth in 1936 and 1937 alone.168
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5.2.3 Financing the Green Deal
The Green Deal is a government initiative to finance the retrofitting of building to 
higher energy efficiency standards. Owners face a big disincentive to invest in such 
improvements if they sell the building before reaping the benefits of cost savings. 
Under the Green Deal, the cost of investment can be repaid by the building owner 
over time through their energy bills, and unlike a conventional loan it stays with the 
building when ownership changes hands. The Green Deal also makes financing 
such improvements easier, with repayments made out of the energy cost savings. 
Financing for the initiative is being arranged by a new not-for-profit financial 
intermediary, the Green Deal Finance Company, which has secured funding from 
the GIB, among others, and is also seeking funding from the EIB.174 An estimated 
£14 billion of financing will be required according to government estimates.175 
However, take-up has been slow so far with fewer than 200 contracts signed up 
in the first five months of 2013, out of 19 000 assessments undertaken.176 Part 
of the reason might be the cost of finance. Homeowners will pay a rate of nearly 
7 per cent, which is more than the rate of interest on most domestic mortgages. 
In contrast, programmes from the German investment bank, KfW, retrofitted one 
million homes in a three-year period between 2006 and 2009. This has to be 
seen in the context of differences in the whole suite of energy and climate change 
policies between the UK and Germany, but one key difference is the financing cost. 
A representative deal for a whole-house energy refurbishment financed through a 
KfW loan is 1 per cent fixed for 10 years.177
The APF is currently paying a rate of interest to the Bank of England of 0.5 per 
cent, and the lowest rate that can be accessed by commercial banks under the 
FLS is even less at 0.25 per cent. Purchasing bonds in the Green Deal Finance 
Company at such low rates of interest could help unlock significant demand for 
building refurbishment which would create significant employment and re-skilling 
opportunities. 
Box 6. Addressing structural problems with the UK housing market. 
There are numerous issues with the UK housing market, including, as we have seen, a volatile and bubble-prone 
mortgage lending market, supply constraints due to bureaucratic planning rules, tax arrangements and subsidies 
that favour private home ownership over other forms of tenure, the house-building sector itself being concentrated in 
the hands of a handful of large construction companies that are prone to ‘land-banking’ (waiting to build until prices 
rise) and, relatedly, the windfall benefits of infrastructure development being concentrated in the hands of these 
developers and private homeowners.
As a result, houses in the UK are increasingly bought as assets or investments rather than places to live. This is in stark 
contrast to many other countries, where different institutional and tax arrangements and constraints on lending have 
led to better balanced tenure distributions, a more diverse and competitive home-building sector building better quality 
homes, and stable home prices, with profits from land appreciation being evenly spread across communities.171 
Local authorities could do what is standard practice in other European countries, and use their rights to purchase (even 
compulsorily) agricultural land at agricultural market prices, before changing the land-use permission. Alternatively, 
innovations in mutual or co-operative land ownership enable the benefits of rising land values to be retained in 
common, while buildings are privately owned.173
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The proposals set out in Section 5 represent practical options for more effective 
targeting of QE. We believe this enhanced monetary activism would better enable 
the Bank of England to deliver on both its primary aim of price stability and also the 
subsidiary aims of delivering on the Government’s economic policy objectives.
However, targeted QE does raise important issues of governance and 
accountability. In this section we examine these issues and propose modifications 
to existing institutional arrangements that can meet these challenges.
6.1 Central bank independence and fiscal neutrality: myth and reality
The separation between monetary and fiscal policy and central bank independence 
over monetary policy has been held up as key reason behind the relatively benign 
economic conditions enjoyed by western economies in the 15 years prior to the 
financial crisis. By providing central banks with operational independence and a 
strong focus on price stability, the idea was that not only actual inflation, but also 
inflationary expectations would be ‘anchored’. This would be beneficial for the 
economy since both companies and households would feel confident to plan 
investments well in to the future. 
The financial crisis of 2007–2009 does not, astonishingly, seem to have led to 
much questioning of this division.179 This is despite the fact that the crisis was 
largely the result of central banks failing to prevent the build-up of massive inflation 
in a key sector of economy: the housing market.180 But this arrangement is not one 
with a long historical precedent. 
6.1.1 A brief history of central banking
Whilst most people probably think of central banks as public institutions, for the 
majority of their history they have been privately owned. Most, however, were 
nationalised after the Great Depression and World War II as governments felt 
they needed more control over this power of money creation to rebuild their 
economies.181 In many countries, governments and central banks worked  
closely together to devise policies that led to high rates of growth and low 
unemployment. 
6. The implementation challenge: good governance
Independent central bankers tend to get very squeamish about 
expressing support for any particular government proposal… 
Tragedies have occurred, however, when [they] let worries about 
the perception that they are too close to the fiscal authority prevent 
them from doing something constructive in times of crisis… It is 
critical… that we do not get caught up in a ‘You first, my friend’, 
‘No, after you, my good sir’, routine over who should make the 
first overture to whom… Even in places where relations between 
fiscal and monetary policymakers are constructive and not fraught 
by distrust, there is a tendency for joint efforts to fall between the 
cracks due to turf considerations and natural divisions of labour. 
We just have to be transparent about this, and we should get going.
Adam Posen, Monetary Policy Committee member, 2009-201278
Strategic quantitative easing 47
Central bank remits in this period were wide. They included achieving GDP growth 
generally and growth in particular in industrial sectors, high employment, exchange 
rate targeting to promote exports and financial stability, as well as price stability.182 
There were no turf wars between fiscal and monetary policy. Then in the 1970s, with 
high levels of inflation, concerns grew that central banks were not paying enough 
attention to price stability. By the 1990s, the idea of central bank operational 
independence had taken off. To maintain low levels of inflation and to anchor 
expectations about future (low) inflation, it was thought that central banks should 
become operationally independent from the government of the day. Not only that, 
but they should be given a very clear remit to focus on inflation targeting as their 
primary goal, above and beyond broader macroeconomic objectives.
For a lengthy period this policy seemed to work. It appeared possible to have 
historically low inflation and stable growth. The ‘Great Moderation’ came to an 
abrupt end with the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression in 2007–2009. 
Suddenly, the narrow focus on inflation and the independence of central banks had 
been called in to question. 
6.1.2 The remit of the Bank of England
One reason that the Bank of England might be reluctant to engage in the kind of 
strategic QE policies we have discussed is that it might be perceived as being 
outside of its remit. What exactly is the Bank of England’s remit? 
The Bank of England is a public institution whose broad role, accordingly, is to serve 
the public interest. This was not always the case, since it was privately owned until 
1946, when the Attlee government nationalised it.183 The Bank of England Act of 
that year transferred the Bank of England’s capital stock to the Treasury and brought 
the Bank ‘under public control’.184 The Bank of England is wholly owned by the 
Government but accountable to Parliament. Each year, it is required to submit its 
Report and Accounts to Parliament, via the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The 1946 
Act also lays out how the Bank of England would relate to the Treasury and other 
banks. The Act states that:
The Treasury may from time to time give such directions to the Bank as, after 
consultations with the Governor of the Bank, they think necessary in the 
public interest. 
And that:
The Bank, if they think it necessary in the public interest, may request 
information from and make recommendations to bankers, and may, if so 
authorised by the Treasury, issue directions to any banker for the purpose of 
securing that effect is given to any such request or recommendation: 
Provided that:-
no such request or recommendation shall be made with respect to the 
affairs of any particular customer of a banker; and
before authorizing the issue of any such directions the Treasury shall give 
the banker concerned, or such person appears to them to represent him, an 
opportunity of making representations with respect thereto.
This remit is obviously quite wide. In theory, it gives the Treasury ultimate control 
over the Bank of England which in turn has a lot of power over commercial banks. 
However, the activity of the Bank of England has, over time, become quite narrowly 
focused on monetary policy with a clear separation between this and fiscal policy. 
What then is ‘monetary policy’? 
6.1.3 Defining monetary policy and its connection to fiscal policy
In the 1980s, under the influence of monetarism, central banks began to focus 
more narrowly on price stability, a feature that in Britain was politically popular 
following the rampant inflation of the 1970s. In 1992, this shift towards maintaining 
low inflation was formalised, with the Government giving the Bank a formal inflation 
target range of 1–4 per cent. Six years later, the Bank of England was given 
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operational independence in the setting of monetary policy, altering the target to 2.5 
per cent,185 and adding a clause to the end of the above statement in regard to the 
direction the Treasury could give to the bank: [except in relation to monetary policy]. 
The 1998 Act also set out more formally the bank’s objectives, stating:
In relation to monetary policy, the objectives of the Bank of England shall 
be—
(a) to maintain price stability, and (b) subject to that, to support the 
economic policy of Her Majesty’s Government.186
The Government’s economic policy objective is:187
…to achieve strong, sustainable and balanced growth that is more evenly 
shared across the country and between industries. This objective recognises 
that over a number of years preceding the recent financial crisis, economic 
growth in the UK was driven by unsustainable levels of private sector 
debt and rising public sector debt. This pattern of unbalanced growth and 
excessive debt helped to create exceptional economic challenges in the UK. 
The Government also handed over control of financial regulation to the independent 
Financial Services Authority (FSA). Following the financial crisis of 2007–2009, the 
Bank of England’s remit has been significantly broadened. The 2009 Banking Act 
gave the Bank of England a statutory objective to protect and enhance the stability 
of the financial systems of the United Kingdom and the Court, consulting HM 
Treasury and on advice from the newly formed Financial Policy Committee (FPC), in 
determining the Bank’s strategy in relation to that objective.188 
None of this, however, really tells us a lot about the monetary/fiscal policy divide. 
It would appear there is nothing in writing to guide policy in this area. Rather, 
we seem to be dependent on statements, mainly by the Bank of England, to 
understand the divide. The most comprehensive statement we could find in recent 
years was made by Mervyn King in a speech last October:189
The role of the Bank of England is to create the right amount of money, 
neither too much, nor too little, to support sustainable growth at the target 
rate of inflation. We are not doing it at the behest of the Government to 
help finance its spending. It is the independence of the Bank that allows us 
to create money without raising doubts about our motives. But just as it is 
crucial that governments do not control the printing of money, so too the 
unelected central bank must not determine the levels of taxes and public 
spending.
Fiscal policy is a matter for elected governments. There has been some talk 
about the possibility that money created by the Bank could be used directly 
to finance additional government spending, or even that money could be 
given away. Abstracting from the colourful metaphor of ‘helicopter money’, 
such operations would combine monetary and fiscal policies.
There is no need to combine them because, as now, once the Bank has 
decided how much money should be created to meet the inflation target, 
the case for the Government to increase spending or cut taxes to counter a 
downturn stands or falls on its own merits… Not only is combining monetary 
and fiscal policies unnecessary, it is also dangerous. Either the government 
controls the process – which is ‘bad’ money creation – or the Bank controls 
it and enters the forbidden territory of fiscal policy.
This is a remarkable statement for a number of reasons. First, it implies that the 
Bank of England can actually determine, reasonably effectively, what the ‘right 
amount of money’ is in the economy. But the financial crisis – and indeed nearly 
all major twentieth-century banking crises – was the result of excessive money 
creation by the banking sector, as a number of studies show and as Adair Turner, 
former Chairman of the FSA has recently stated.190,191,192 If Mervyn King accepts 
this, then he must also accept that the Bank of England got its estimations of the 
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‘right amount’ of money in the economy completely wrong in the period leading up 
the financial crisis.
The reality is that 97 per cent of the money in circulation is created by commercial 
banks and just 3 per cent by the central bank.193 And deregulation between 
the 1970s and 2000s has meant that the Bank of England has chosen to have 
increasingly little, if any, control of over commercial bank credit creation (see also 
Box 1 on the money multiplier myth). Rather, ‘banks make loans first and search 
for the reserves later’ in the words of Federal Reserve Banker, Alan Holmes.194 The 
central bank must always ensure there are sufficient reserves in the banking system 
or it will collapse, with catastrophic results for the economy.
Mervyn King terms ‘bad money creation’ a situation where the government of the 
day controls the process of money creation. One wonders, then, what the Governor 
would call the 370 per cent increase in mortgage credit created by the banking 
system in the period 1997–2007 that eventually contributed to the financial crisis. 
Presumably, this is ‘good’ money creation? Such a distinction purely on the basis 
of whether money creation is in public or private hands appears to us to be simply 
ideological rather than grounded in evidence. 
If the Bank of England has virtually no control over the amount of money in 
circulation and where it is allocated, the argument for a strong divide between 
monetary and fiscal policy to ensure central bank ‘independence’ is undermined. 
Monetary policy, defined as control over the creation and allocation of money, would 
then appear to be entirely in the hands of commercial banks. The Bank’s role is not 
to scrutinise or direct such activities, hence providing some element of democratic 
accountability, but to prop up this system by supporting such commercial banks 
(for the sake of the wider economy) by ensuring there is sufficient liquidity in the 
system. 
There is then a very strong democratic and economic argument to say that current 
arrangements need reform. Furthermore, as this report has detailed in Sections 2 
and 3, QE does favour certain sectors of the market economy over others. Buying 
government bonds would appear to increase asset prices and thus support (mainly 
large) UK private companies and that very concentrated part of the UK population 
that holds such assets. It is not clear why this kind of monetary policy is any more 
neutral than buying corporate bonds issued by agencies with a remit to invest in 
infrastructure or home-building or SMEs. Indeed, one might argue the onus is on 
the Bank of England to demonstrate why it has not bought assets to support these 
neglected sectors of the economy as to do so would surely more evenly balance 
out the fiscal impact of QE policies. 
 
At one point during 2011, it did look as if the Treasury and the Bank of England 
were about to enact a policy – ‘credit easing’ – that would have supported the SME 
sector through Bank of England purchase of securitized SME loans.195 Many were 
in favour of such an intervention, including former MPC member Charles Goodhart 
who makes the same point that such an intervention is not really any less or more 
‘fiscal’ than existing QE:
This [credit easing] proposal, however, runs into the question whether such 
a mechanism should be regarded as primarily fiscal, and within the purview 
of the Ministry of Finance, rather than monetary. Such lending would both 
involve risk and involve intervention in markets to shift relative prices. Indeed 
so, but existing QE in whatever form involves risk, even if collateralized, and 
also shifts relative prices; that is, after all, largely the purpose of the exercise 
via portfolio effects.196,197 
6.1.4 The blurring of the monetary/fiscal policy dividing line
Recent developments suggest the ice may be melting on the monetary/fiscal 
policy divide. Most obviously, these are the addition to the Bank’s remit of ‘financial 
resilience’ and the creation of the Financial Policy Committee (FPC). The FPC’s job 
is to conduct ‘macroprudential policy’ which involves assessing system-wide risks to 
the resilience of the economy and which has powers of direction to intervene where 
it considers unsustainable risk is building up. 
Strategic quantitative easing 50
The FPC’s powers include the ability to influence bank credit creation via making 
adjustments to the amount of capital banks must hold against assets, both in 
total and by sector. Specifically, the FPC will bring in to force Sectoral Capital 
Requirements (SCRs).198 Thus if the FPC felt that excessive lending was being 
created for the real estate or domestic housing market, posing system risk to the 
economy, it could increase SCRs on these types of loans. It would also provide 
targeted incentives for banks to limit the expansion of riskier exposures. The list 
of indicators upon which the FPC can alter SCRs includes Bank leverage ratios, 
average mortgage risk-weights, balance sheet interconnectedness (with other 
banks), intra-financial borrowing growth, derivatives growth, overseas concentration, 
credit growth to household and commercial real estate, debt-to-profit/income ratios 
for companies, households and non-bank financial intermediaries, price-to-rent 
ratios, loan-to-value- and-income ratios, and spreads on corporate and mortgage 
lending.199,200 
Even if the objective of SCRs is financial system resilience rather than GDP growth, 
they appear to be a first step towards the Bank of England regaining the power to 
more directly control credit creation and allocation in the economy. Senior members 
of the FPC, including Andy Haldane, and former member Adair Turner have already 
questioned whether the FPC should also have explicit powers to encourage more 
bank lending to particular sectors, the SME sector in particular.201,202
Rather than being a radical departure in to the dangerous land of credit allocation, if 
the Bank of England was to take up Haldane and Turner’s proposal, it would simply 
be returning to what was quite standard practise in the post-war period. Then the 
Bank of England had its own (informal) qualitative and quantitative credit controls, 
known as ‘moral suasion’. As reported in a review of monetary policy in the 1960s, 
this was effective in limiting the total amount of credit banks could create and set 
quotas for specific sectors, always according priority to export finance.203,204,205 
It should be noted that this period of credit guidance coincided with high rates 
of growth and employment in the UK and similar positive correlations have been 
observed in a range of other development and developing countries.206,207 In 
contrast, cross-country studies where central banks have focused strictly on 
inflation targeting and left credit creation and allocation to ‘the market’, suggest 
there is no positive effect on nominal GDP growth or employment.208
Other recent examples of fiscal/monetary ‘blurring’ include the decision by the 
Treasury to move the profits of the APF on to the Government’s balance sheet 
(Section 3.4) and, to some extent at least, the FLS. Some commentators suggest 
the FLS involves the Bank of England taking risk of a particular type on to its 
balance sheet without indemnity from the Government, in contrast to the APF.209,210 
When we sought clarification from the Bank of England on this point, it said that 
it is only at risk from the collateral the commercial banks post rather than the 
loans themselves.211 The Bank of England does not publish details of the specific 
collateral that banks post.
Either way, Mervyn King has admitted that the FLS involves the Bank of England 
favouring a particular sector of the economy because of a perceived ‘market failure’, 
although he is careful to imply that the Government ultimately made the decision to 
commence the scheme:212
The question is why would we want to decide which assets should be 
purchased rather than the market itself? Now if you can detect an example 
– which we did with small and medium sized enterprises – where they are 
being particularly harshly treated, where there is particular market failure, 
then there is an argument for intervention. But that’s an argument for giving a 
subsidy to that sector relative to the rest of the economy… That is something 
which the government should decide, not us…
Well, if there is a market failure in getting credit to SMEs, then there are surely also 
major ‘market failures’ in the areas of infrastructure and house-building, failures with 
major short-, medium- and long-term welfare costs to the UK economy. We would 
argue that there is equal justification for intervention in these sectors. 
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6.2 Governing strategic QE: the Monetary Allocation Committee
Rather than attempting to persuade the Bank of England to return uncomfortably 
to its broader remit of the 1960s, the Treasury might be better served focusing on 
creating an institutional framework that would enable QE to be directed to the real 
economy in a way that the Bank of England would be comfortable with. In any case, 
we argue that there is room for improvement in the decision-making process for the 
allocation of QE asset purchases. 
Let us briefly examine the logic for restricting asset purchases to gilts. Any losses 
incurred by the APF are underwritten by the Treasury; the directors of the APF, 
it would appear, have sought to ensure that there is the minimum of credit risk 
attached to any asset purchases that they make (e.g. the corporate bonds the APF 
purchased were of investment grade only). However, there still remains significant 
market risk on the potential sale of any bonds that are not held to maturity. The 
Government might not default on the bond, but the APF might still have to sell it 
back to the market for less than it purchased it for, thereby incurring a capital loss. 
Furthermore, the Government always intended the APF to buy a broader range of 
assets, so who made the decision to only purchase gilts?
Let us first recall the current governance arrangements for the APF (Section 3.2). 
The MPC decides on the quantity of assets to be purchased. Who decides on the 
type of assets to be purchased? Not the MPC, it seems, as evidence from former 
member of the MPC, Adam Posen, to the Treasury Select Committee, suggests that 
MPC members were even blocked from discussing the purchase of a broader range 
of assets during MPC meetings.213
The APF is structured as a limited company, the Bank of England Asset Purchase 
Facility Fund Limited, wholly owned by the Bank of England. It is the directors of the 
APF who decide on the allocation of purchases. There are two directors, Spencer 
Dale and Paul Fisher, both of whom are executives of the Bank of England and 
who directly report to the Deputy-Governor, Charlie Bean, who in turn reports to the 
Governor. It this group of Directors that ultimately decides on how QE funds will be 
allocated. There are no independent non-executive directors,214 and according to 
Posen, no oversight by or accountability to the MPC. 
After stepping down as MPC member, Posen publicly criticised the Governor and 
others for ignoring his pleas for the Bank of England to use the APF to capitalise an 
SME-financing public bank. Posen is quoted by Reuters as stating:215 
The current and previous chancellor wanted to see strong monetary easing 
and wanted at least contemplated alternative asset purchases, but were 
unwilling to take on an independent central bank’ […] But an independent 
central bank isn’t the same as one individual being able to block discussion.
We suggest that the transparency and oversight of asset allocation decisions can 
be improved. The Treasury should create an independent ‘Monetary Allocation 
Committee’ (MAC), with clear terms of reference and answerable to Parliament via 
the Treasury Select Committee, that could decide on the optimal allocation of asset 
purchases. This would include not only new QE, but also the reinvestment of some 
£100 billion of bonds maturing during the next five years. The MAC would direct the 
operations of the APF, effectively becoming the board of directors of the existing 
Bank of England Asset Purchase Facility Fund Limited.
The MAC would have a much broader macroeconomic remit than the Bank of 
England and might be best staffed by academic macroeconomists and industry 
leaders, in much the same way as the MPC. Their focus would be on the best use 
of QE money in terms of employment, regional imbalances, capital investment, 
supporting SMEs, spare capacity, exports and the trade balance, energy security, 
and carbon targets. The MAC would be expected to coordinate closely with the FPC 
and the MPC and could have non-executive members of each plus the Treasury on 
its board. The quantity and maturity structure of asset purchases would remain with 
the MPC with its focus on longer-term rates and inflation. 
We propose that the remits of the MAC and the MPC might be complementary as 
set out in Box 7.
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This is a clearer and more accountable separation of responsibilities than exists 
currently. However, one area that would require greater clarity is the terms of the 
loan from the Bank of England to the APF. One of the reasons for almost the entire 
portfolio of APF assets being invested in gilts is to maintain liquidity. In theory, the 
MPC might wish to rapidly tighten monetary policy and call in the loan of central 
bank reserves to the APF. However, in practice it would take years to sell £375 
billion of gilts without severely disrupting markets, particularly bearing in mind the 
Government’s on-going financing needs for new gilt issuance. This reality should 
be explicitly acknowledged, with a proportion of the loan being over longer terms, 
perhaps up to 10 years or longer, which can be used to support the Government’s 
economic policy. A significant proportion of the APF’s assets could continue to be 
in gilts to allow for the possibility of rapid tightening of policy though asset sales, 
but the experience of QE in the UK and other countries has shown that significant 
quantities of bonds are in practice held to maturity.
6.2.1 Use of intermediaries
Even though at arm’s length from the Government, it is important that the MAC 
does not have the ability to explicitly choose certain projects or companies over 
others. As set out above in Section 5.2, the APF should act via intermediaries such 
as the BBB, the GIB, the Green Deal Finance Company or a newly established 
Housing Investment Bank. Preventing the MAC or the APF from engaging in ‘picking 
winners’ both ensures the correct division of responsibilities and isolates the MAC 
from any danger of political pressure to favour particular projects or companies.
The financial crisis has seen the creation of a variety of novel new institutions and 
interventions in the UK economy – including QE, FLS, the FPC, the Prudential 
Regulation Authority, the Financial Conduct Authority, and green and business 
investment banks. An MAC would not seem to be qualitatively different to 
these other innovations. The FLS itself is overseen by a joint operating board 
of the Treasury and the Bank, suggesting there are no great barriers to the two 
organisations working together to direct credit in those areas of the economy where 
it is most needed.216
What is clear is that the new Governor of the Bank of England Mark Carney has 
plenty of room for manoeuvre should he wish to. George Osborne appears very 
open to further monetary activism and boosting GDP growth. In his last letter to the 
outgoing Governor, George Osborne set out a new remit for the Bank, stating:
Monetary activism has a vital role to play in the Government’s economic 
strategy as the Government delivers on its commitment to fiscal 
consolidation. Given the on-going exceptional challenges facing the UK 
economy, it is possible the Committee may judge it necessary to deploy 
Box 7. Division of responsibilities between MPC and the MAC
MPC MAC
Objectives:
(1) to maintain price stability, and
(2) subject to that, to support the Government’s economic 
policy
Objectives:
(1) to support the Government’s economic policy
(2) subject to the proviso that its actions should not endanger 
the goal of price stability
Decides on the quantity and maturity terms of central bank 
reserves loaned to the APF as part of monetary policy
Decides on the type of assets to be purchased by the APF to 
best meet economic policy goals
Takes the impact of MAC asset purchases into consideration 
(alongside all other macroeconomic data) in reviewing 
monetary policy at monthly meetings.
Manages the portfolio of assets to maintain sufficient liquidity 
to respond to MPC monetary policy decisions.
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new unconventional policy instruments or approaches in future, including 
some of those deployed by other central banks in recent years. The remit 
clarifies that the development of new unconventional instruments should 
include consideration with Government of appropriate governance and 
accountability arrangements.217
6.3 But what about inflation?
Inflation is currently above its 2 per cent target level for the economy and has been 
for some time. So a major objection to the schemes suggested, as it has been for 
QE since it commenced, is that they would cause even higher inflation, eating in to 
already strained incomes and thus further dampening demand in the economy. 
There are a number of responses here. First, the Bank of England itself does not 
consider inflation to be a problem for the present time. Indeed it remains much 
more fearful of deflation as is evidenced by keeping interest rates at 0.5 per cent 
and creating £375 billion of QE. Most research suggests that domestic inflation 
– i.e. pressures on prices driven by the cost of labour and goods and services 
produced here in the UK – remains low. Indeed, one reason for the slow recovery is 
the fact that median wages in the UK have been flat lining at under 2 per cent since 
the middle of 2010 (Figure 16). In a recent speech, MPC member Paul Fisher noted 
the remarkable acquiescence of British workers to such a huge relative fall in their 
incomes since the crisis.218
Inflationary pressures are instead coming from imports (unsurprising given the 
20 per cent decline in sterling since the crisis began), energy prices, and one-off 
policy changes such as rises in VAT and education fees.219 It may also be the case 
that QE policies globally have contributed to imported inflation, particularly where 
investors have chosen to invest deposits in commodities and related derivatives, a 
dynamic that many suggest has raised prices in developing countries.220 
Secondly, in our proposed arrangement, the MAC would have a very strict remit to 
only choose to invest QE purchases where there is clearly spare capacity in the 
UK economy. But at the present time, this does not look like a difficult challenge. 
The UK labour market continues to have significant spare capacity.221 Therefore we 
contend that targeted QE should be less inflationary, and have less of an exchange 
rate impact, than the current non-targeted approach that relies partially on (asset 
price) inflation for its efficacy. 
 
More generally, economic analysis tells us that there is a strong positive relationship 
between inflation and employment, whereby employees’ stronger bargaining 
position in a tighter labour market will inevitably push up prices. However, recent 
research by the IMF suggests that the long-assumed link between employment and 
inflation may have broken down. In a study of 21 rich countries since the 1960s, the 
IMF shows that changes in unemployment now influence inflation much less than 
in the past.222 Possible explanations include much more flexible labour markets 
and weaker trade unions and potentially the ‘anchoring’ of inflation expectations 
with independent central banks. Without the breakdown in this relationship, the IMF 
estimated the US economy would have faced deflation rates approaching 3 per 
cent in the wake of the recent recession.223 Whatever the explanation, concerns 
about inflation do not look like a credible objection to strategic QE.
Third, it is worth making a straightforward economic argument. If a loan funds the 
building of a house, or a railway or a broadband network, it is creating a productive 
asset. A productive asset creates value over many years, providing a continuous 
flow of increased products and services over time. Money spent on such an asset 
should thus be able to be absorbed in to the economy without creating inflation. 
Productivity levels in construction and infrastructure are generally higher than in the 
services sector. As Paul Fisher argued in the same speech, ‘faster growth in the 
near-term might actually keep inflation down for a while especially as productivity 
growth picks up.’224
In contrast, if new money is created and spent on existing assets, such as existing 
houses, equities, bonds, or derivatives, this does not create any new flow of value 
– instead it is more likely to simply increase the price of the asset (i.e. asset-price 
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inflation). As far as we can see, QE so far has primarily resulted in the latter and the 
Bank has been able to largely ignore asset price inflation because this is simply not 
part of its measurement of inflation. The FPC has been introduced to make up for 
this gap in the Bank of England’s regulatory framework. To help it along, we suggest 
now is the time to reduce the impact of QE on asset price inflation and concentrate 
public money on productive investment. 
Finally, perhaps the most subtle part of monetary policy arrangements is the 
importance attached to maintaining expectations of low inflation. This is because a 
loss of confidence in the ability or desire of monetary authorities to maintain price 
stability can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. It is primarily on the grounds of the 
potential negative impacts on inflation expectations that, in its recent review of 
monetary policy frameworks,225 the Treasury rejected the option of ‘Overt Money 
Financing’ advocated by Lord Turner.226
We contend that Strategic QE should not cause an adverse change in inflationary 
expectations for two reasons:
1. The objective of targeting QE on real economy investment where spare capacity 
exists is intended to avoid generalised price inflation.
2. The proposed institutional arrangements do not weaken the MPC’s 
independence or remit at all, and provide greater transparency by separating the 
control over the quantity central bank asset purchases from allocation decisions. 
It should therefore strengthen credibility overall.
Indeed, we suggest that concern about the impact of QE on inflationary 
expectations might be better addressed by efforts to educate the public and 
address some of the wilder media commentary about ‘printing money’.
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QE may have prevented a worse recession but it has not led to a recovery. 
The hope was that it would encourage investors to put their money into ‘riskier’ 
corporate equity and encourage savers and financial asset holders to spend more. 
But there is not much evidence that either of these ‘wealth effects’ has boosted 
investment and spending. 
Our empirical evidence supports the thesis that expansion of credit specifically for 
the real economy (defined here as GDP transactions) is a more significant factor 
in explaining changes in GDP than so-called unconventional monetary policy 
instruments and conventional instruments, such as adjustments to interest rates. 
QE has been ineffective in stimulating such bank lending, and although perhaps 
too early to tell, the impact of the FLS looks similarly limited in the context of the 
banking sectors’ on-going balance sheet retrenchment and long-term structural 
and regulatory bias against real economy lending. The Bank of England has never 
expected QE to have a significant impact on bank lending, and this expectation is 
supported both in theory and practice.
However, the evidence of positive impact on nominal GDP through the portfolio 
rebalancing channel is also unimpressive. 
We have examined two alternatives for increasing the impact of QE:
1. Purchasing illiquid and riskier assets from existing banks to speed up their 
balance sheet reconstruction, as the US Federal Reserve has done with 
apparent success.
2. Funding agencies with a specific remit to invest in real economy activities, such 
as the BBB, the GIB, and housing construction by housing associations and 
local authorities. 
Of these alternatives, we believe that the first option would be likely to have 
a greater impact on nominal GDP than current QE; however, cross-country 
comparisons can be misleading. The USA has a significant local banking sector, 
accounting for approximately a third of banking assets. It also has the Small 
Business Administration that supports lending to SMEs through loan guarantees. 
The UK currently lacks such a favourable infrastructure for business lending, and so 
the impact may be considerably less effective than in the USA. 
Enabling banks to lend more will not be effective in stimulating investment, 
production, and employment if the lion’s share of new credit goes into mortgages 
and lending to the financial sector.
We recommend the second option as providing a more direct and controllable 
channel to ensure that QE results in non-inflationary expansion of investment and 
employment. By structuring the provision of funding through the purchase of bonds 
in intermediaries, the current mechanism of QE remains essentially the same with 
the difference being the type of financial security being purchased. It also has the 
benefit of developing capital markets for investment in these sectors and leading 
potentially to ‘crowding-in’ private sector investors.
7. Conclusions
Credit is the pavement along which production travels, and the 
bankers if they knew their duty, would provide the transport facilities 
to just the extent that is required in order that the productive powers 
of the community can be employed at their full capacity.
John Maynard Keynes227
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We recognise the validity of concerns about the process of decision-making, 
governance, and accountability for expanding QE beyond the narrow remit of gilt 
purchases.
However, we think that efforts to maintain a clear distinction between fiscal and 
monetary policy can be a red herring. In reality, such distinctions have always 
been blurred and have broken down further with the deployment of unconventional 
monetary policy since the crisis. The more important question is what institutional 
arrangements are best for preserving the integrity of each kind of decision. We 
believe that a separation of powers between the MPC, deciding the quantity of 
QE in line with its current remit, and a new Monetary Allocation Committee to 
decide how best to allocate QE to deliver against a broader set of goals, including 
investment and employment. 
As shown by the case studies of the Canadian Industrial Development Bank and 
New Zealand’s house-building programme, both funded by loans from the central 
bank, there are successful international historical precedents for these proposals. 
And in the UK itself, for close to 30 years after World War II it was standard practise 
for the Bank of England, in discussions with the Treasury, to directly influence bank 
credit creation according to broad macroeconomic objectives.
Any new institutional arrangements and policy measures involve a degree of risk, 
but since 2008 there has been a series of institutional and policy innovations and 
unconventional monetary policy measures. Indeed, the Chancellor has called for 
more monetary activism from the new Governor of the Bank of England and a 
stronger focus on growth. The greater risk to the economy would be posed by a 
failure to answer his call. The time is right for strategic QE.
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Glossary
Bank deposits:  Bank deposits, either held in current (sight) and no-notice savings accounts 
or in savings accounts with fixed-term notice periods. The word ‘deposit’ is 
conventional but misleading in the ordinary English use of the term. These 
balances are a liability of the bank, in other words simply an electronic IOU 
to the customer from the bank. The customer is given a guarantee that 
the bank will honour this IOU up to £85 000 under the Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme.
Base rate:  The main interest rate set by the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy 
Committee, which reviews it on a monthly basis. Also known as the Bank 
Rate or Policy Rate, it is the rate at which the Bank of England will lend 
funds overnight to commercial banks. Currently it is also the rate of interest 
paid on commercial banks’ reserves held at the Bank of England.
Capital markets:  Markets for tradable financial instruments including shares (equity), bonds 
(debt instruments), commodities, and financial derivatives.
Central bank: The central bank acts as the bank for commercial banks. It performs the 
function of lender of last resort and generally is tasked with carrying out 
monetary policy. Some central banks are also responsible for regulation of 
financial firms. The UK’s central bank is the Bank of England.
Central bank reserves:  The balances held at the Bank of England by commercial banks, 
effectively equivalent to current accounts for commercial banks. They are 
the ultimate means of payment between banks. This form of money cannot 
be held directly by ordinary households and business, or indeed by financial 
institutions, such as credit unions, that do not have reserve accounts at the 
Bank of England.
Collateral:  Assets that are offered as security to the lender by a borrower. Ownership 
of the assets remains with the borrower unless he defaults on repayment of 
the loan, in which case the lender has the legal right to seize the asset. The 
most familiar example for most people is a mortgage for which the house is 
collateral for the mortgage company.
Commercial banks:  All licensed deposit-taking institutions (i.e. banks) that are not central 
banks, including shareholder-owned, mutual, and publically owned banks.
Coupon rate:  The amount of interest paid every year on a bond, in relation to the face 
value of the bond. As bonds are traded on financial markets, investors can 
purchase them for a price that is more or less than face value, and thus the 
actual return received by the investor will be different to the coupon rate 
(see Yield to maturity) 
Financial Policy Committee (FPC):  The FPC is a committee at the Bank of England whose primary objective 
is the stability of the UK financial system. Created in April 2013, it seeks to 
monitor and identify sources of excessive systemic financial risk and take 
action to reduce it.
Fiscal policy:  Usually defined as the use of government spending and taxation to 
influence the economy.
Funding for lending scheme (FLS):  See Section 3.4.
GDP-related transactions:  Also referred to as real economy transactions, these are financial 
transactions that are recorded as part of GDP. Not all bank loans are 
considered GDP transactions, for example, lending between financial 
institutions or for the purchase of existing financial assets are excluded 
because they do not create additional economic output.
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Gilts:  The name given to UK Government bonds (tradable debt instruments), 
distinguishing them from bonds issued by other institutions such as 
corporations.
Government bonds:  See Gilts.
Gross Fixed Capital Formation:  Includes land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, 
machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, 
railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential 
dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. 
Monetary policy:  Usually defined as the manipulation of interest rates, or other means of 
influencing the supply of money, in order to influence the economy.
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC):  The committee at the Bank of England whose primary objective is to 
achieve price stability by means of manipulating the Base rate, and other 
interventions in the banking system.
Official bank rate  See Base rate.
Open market operations (OMOs):  See definition on page 10.
Private non-financial corporation (PNFC):  Businesses that are owned privately, including those whose shares are 
traded on public stock exchanges, and are not financial institutions. In other 
words they are companies that produce goods and/or provide non-financial 
services. 
Real economy:  The part of the economy that is concerned with producing goods and 
services, as opposed to the part of the economy that is concerned with 
buying and selling financial assets.
Repurchase agreement (repo):  See definition on page 10.
Reverse repurchase agreement 
(reverse repo):  See definition on page 10.
Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS):  See definition on page 12.
Treasury bills (T-bills):  Gilts that have a maturity of up to 12 months. They are ‘zero coupon’; in 
other words no interest payments are made on them. Instead they are sold 
at a discount to their face value, with the discount representing the financial 
return to the buyer. The discount is determined through a competitive 
bidding process where buyers state what price they would be willing to pay 
for the bills. 
Yield to maturity:  The overall rate of return received by a purchaser of a bond. It includes 
all the regular interest (or coupon) payments plus the repayment of the 
principal, or face value of the bond, upon maturity. 
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